



 Do you get worried when you discover that some of your philosophical colleagues 
 disagree with your philosophical views? What if you know these colleagues to be  smarter 
and, with respect to the relevant issues,  better informed than you? Suppose the situation is 
more worrisome still: you fi nd that a  large number and percentage of the people you know 
full well to be smarter and better informed than you in the relevant area hold positions 
contrary to your own. Will you, or should you, waver in your view? And then there is the 
nightmare scenario: suppose the belief in question, the one denied by a large number 
and percentage of the group of people you fully admit to be your betters on the relevant 
topics, is one of the most commonsensical beliefs there are. Are you going to retain your 
belief in that situation? 
 It is common for philosophers to have philosophical opinions on topics outside their 
areas of specialty. Not only that: a good portion of those opinions are highly controver-
sial. Take an analytic metaphysician who has fi rm opinions on content externalism, 
 evidentialism, and the Millian view of proper names despite having done no serious 
research in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, or the philosophy of language. If this 
is an average philosopher, then she will know that some of the people who work in 
those other areas and disagree with her are not just better informed but smarter than she 
is. How can she rationally think they are all wrong? 
 In this essay I examine the “nightmare” case described above both generally with 
regard to any area of inquiry and with respect to philosophy. After looking at the general 
case I will focus on its most extreme application: learning that one’s epistemic superiors 
deny just about the most commonsensical claims imaginable. 
 Children do not say the damndest things; philosophy professors do. Some of them say 
that there are no baseballs. Or that nothing is morally wrong. Or that twice two isn’t 
four. Others truly believe that there are no beliefs. Or that taking one cent from a rich 
person can instantly make them no longer rich. Or that no claims using vague concepts 
are true (not even “Dogs are dogs”). Some hold that nothing is true, as truth is an incon-
sistent concept. Many think that fi re engines aren’t red (or any other color). And of 
course some hold that we know next to nothing about the external physical world. 
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 The proponents of these views aren’t fools. Many of them are among our best and 
brightest. They are as intellectually virtuous and accomplished as anyone in philosophy. 
Some are outright geniuses. Over many years they look at the evidence as carefully and 
competently as anyone, and then with full sobriety come to contravene common 
sense—and often enough they have to fi ght hard against their own prejudices in order 
to endorse their radical conclusions. 
 And yet, if you are a typical philosopher then you probably believe that they’re all 
wrong in endorsing those “error theories.” This wouldn’t be so bad but for the fol-
lowing facts: you are well aware that often enough the philosophers who hold the 
anti-commonsensical opinions are generally more informed than you are on those 
topics, they have more raw intelligence, they have thought and investigated whether 
the claims in question are true longer and in more depth than you have, they have 
thought about and investigated the relevant topics longer and in more depth than 
you have, they are just as or even more intellectually careful than you are, and they 
have understood and fairly and thoroughly evaluated virtually all the evidence you 
have seen regarding those claims (and usually quite a bit more evidence). I know this 
is all true for me compared with many philosophers who endorse anti-commonsen-
sical philosophical theories, and if you don’t think it’s true for you, you’re probably 
deluded.  You know perfectly well that you’re not a top philosopher on the meta-
physics of material composition. Or the metaphysics of cognition. Or metaethics. 
Or the philosophy of mathematics. Or vagueness. Or theories of truth. Or the meta-
physics of color. Or the nature of knowledge. At the very least, let’s assume that the 
above list of facts apply to you with respect to some of those philosophical areas. 
Despite having genuine respect for people you know to be your epistemic superiors 
with regard to the relevant topics, you continue to disagree with them on those very 
issues: you are an  epistemic renegade . This certainly looks epistemically naughty. 
 In this essay I present an argument for metaphilosophical skepticism, the thesis that in 
the nightmare scenario if one retains one’s belief, then in most interesting cases that 
belief retention is  seriously epistemically defective . What the defect is, however, depends on 
the circumstances as well as how various epistemic notions are interrelated. If the belief 
is highly theoretical (e.g., Millianism for proper names, evidentialism, content external-
ism, four-dimensionalism), then I hold that the renegade’s belief will be unwarranted, 
unjustifi ed, and blameworthy. However, if the belief is a commonsensical one held in 
the face of an error theory (e.g., “I have hands” versus a philosophical theory that says 
there are no composite objects), that belief may well be justifi ed and amount to know-
ledge even after being retained; what the serious epistemic defect amounts to in that 
case depends on how the central epistemic  concepts are related to one another. This 
amounts to a new, peculiar, and highly contingent kind of radical skepticism. 1 
 1 I argued for a related thesis in my 2010. That essay had major fl aws, including an imprecise argument 
and a diff erent thesis. The present essay is perfect.  
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 If the skeptical thesis is false, then we  do have full-fl edged knowledge in the nightmare 
scenario involving error theories and our retaining our commonsensical beliefs is epis-
temically a-okay. As I will argue this would mean that many of us know perfectly well 
that many of the most popular philosophical theories are false despite the facts that 
we are well aware of our status as amateurs with respect to those topics, that we are 
aware of the impressive arguments for those theories, and that those arguments are gen-
erally as good as and even superior to the arguments in other philosophical areas. The 
startling consequence is that large portions of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, 
the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of physics, and metaethics are bunk and phil-
osophers should give up most of their error theories despite the fact that their support-
ing arguments are generally as good as or even better than other philosophical 
arguments. Thus,  whether or not the skeptical thesis is true for the error theory cases we get 
interesting epistemological results. 
 This is a long essay, so it is prudent to give its structure here. In sections 1–4 I  discuss 
the general phenomenon of disagreement with recognized epistemic superiors and 
articulate why it seems that if a person retains her belief upon fi nding herself in that situ-
ation, then her doing so will thereby be signifi cantly diminished in some important 
epistemic respect. In section 5 I will present the offi  cial rigorous argument for metaphilo-
sophical skepticism. Objections to the premises of that argument make up sections 6–11. 
In section 12 I consider what the epistemic defect should be in the cases of a common-
sensical belief held in the face of disagreement with an error theory. Finally, in section 13 
I consider the epistemological consequences of the falsity of metaphilosophical skepti-
cism, which in my view are just as interesting as the consequences of its truth. 
 1 The purely scientifi c case 
 Suppose you believe Jupiter has fewer than ten moons because that’s what you heard 
when you were in school thirty years ago. However, suppose also that over the interven-
ing years evidence has accumulated in favor of a theory that there are over 200 moons 
orbiting Jupiter. As a result, a large number and percentage of professional astronomers 
have, independently of one another, come to accept the new theory. You become aware 
of these two facts, about the evidence and the resultant professional opinion. Still, you 
reject the new theory even though you admit the hard truth that the professionals have 
all your evidence and much more.  You just think that they must have made some  mistake, 
as it seems absurd to you that a planet could have over 200 moons. You are aware of their 
opinion, their comparative expertise, and their epistemic advantage over yourself. And 
yet you think they are wrong and you do so even though you fully admit that you have 
no evidence that they lack or have overlooked. You’re not a professional astronomer. 
Presumably, you’ll say in your defense that they just must have made a mistake  somewhere 
in digesting the new evidence, although you don’t know what the new evidence even is 
or what the mistake might be. 
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 On the face of it, your belief that there are fewer than ten moons of Jupiter won’t 
amount to knowledge. Your belief might be true of course; the professionals aren’t infal-
lible.  And your belief started out with some impressive justifi cation, as it was acquired in 
what we can assume is the usually reliable way of reading reliable science textbooks 
(though many of the authors of those books have since recanted, so your belief-forming 
process really doesn’t look reliable under that highly relevant description). But given 
that you are perfectly aware of the large percentage and number of specialists who dis-
agree with you, you admit that they are your epistemic superiors on the topics in ques-
tion, and you admit that you have no evidence that they lack, your belief won’t amount 
to knowledge even if it’s true. 
 The numbers and percentages of specialists matter. If there were just a couple outlier 
professional astronomers who thought Jupiter had over 200 moons, but you were aware 
of a great many other specialists who insisted the number was fewer than ten even 
though they were well aware of the outliers’ opinion, reasoning, and evidence, then per-
haps you could still  know that Jupiter had fewer than ten moons even though you  admit 
that the outliers are genuine experts and have all the evidence you have as well as much 
more evidence.  You note that all the other specialists think the outliers are wrong and so 
you conclude on that basis that the outliers must have made a mistake somewhere in 
evaluating the evidence, or they lack some evidence that the other experts have, even 
though you may not have the slightest idea what the mistake or extra evidence is. 
 One’s awareness of the specialists’ views also matters. Suppose the “over 200 moons” 
theory is based on evidence that was generated with some new technology that has 
been proven to work in many areas but is now being applied in an area for which it is not 
suited. Suppose further that there was no then-current way the scientists could have 
foreseen this limitation. Now pretend that inter-country communication among 
astronomers is poor, so even though there is a large group of astronomers in the UK, say, 
who are well aware of and perhaps using the new technology (and thus taking the “over 
200 moons” theory very seriously), in the US very few astronomers have even heard of 
the new technology let alone used it. (This scenario isn’t realistic today, but that hardly 
matters.) Finally, pretend that you’re an amateur astronomer in the US who has never 
heard of the new technology or the “over 200 moons” theory and who believes— 
correctly and on the basis of sound if ultimately inconclusive evidence—that Jupiter has 
no more than ten moons. While it’s true that if you had occasion to learn about the new 
technology you would not be able to even suggest that there is anything wrong with or 
inapplicable about it, the mere fact that some people with whom you don’t communi-
cate have made an error that you could not rectify doesn’t seem to sabotage your know-
ledge that Jupiter has fewer than ten moons. Since you’re not part of their epistemic 
community, their mistake doesn’t infect you in an epistemic manner. 
 To make this clearer, consider an amateur astronomer in the UK who is your coun-
terpart in the following ways: she also believes that Jupiter has fewer than ten moons and 
holds this belief on the basis of the same evidence that you use. However, unlike you, the 
UK amateur knows that there is impressive evidence that Jupiter has well over ten 
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moons. She knows this because she knows that the top UK astronomers wouldn’t be 
convinced of the “over 200 moons” theory if they didn’t have impressive evidence 
(again, this is not to say that she thinks the top UK astronomers are infallible or even 
right on this particular issue). Roughly, since the UK amateur knows that there is 
impressive evidence against her belief, and she has no counter to that evidence, her 
belief is thereby epistemically diminished compared to yours. Her familiarity with the 
new technology and with the excellent sociological status among experts of both the 
soundness of the new technology and the subsequent “over 200 moons” theory sabo-
tages her knowledge. We will see later that this epistemic diff erence between you and 
your UK counterpart has signifi cance also for metaphilosophical skepticism. 
 The conclusions drawn in the previous paragraphs seem pretty reasonable, even 
though we’ve skipped over important qualifi cations (which I’ll get to below). But when 
we substitute philosophical for scientifi c inquiry nothing seems so obvious anymore. 
Pretend that 45 per cent of the philosophers who have thoroughly examined all the 
apparently relevant issues in metaphysics conclude that there are no non-living com-
posite material objects; another 45 per cent have come to the opposite conclusion; and 
the fi nal 10 per cent remain agnostic on this point. The philosophers in the fi rst group 
think there are no baseballs even though there are swarms of particles that are arranged 
baseball-wise. Suppose further that these philosophers don’t hedge their view. They 
hold that whenever an ordinary person says, under ordinary circumstances, something 
like “There are four baseballs in the trunk of the car,” what she says—and believes—is 
just plain false even though perfectly reasonable and useful. In such a society would an 
ontologically commonsensical philosopher who is an amateur at metaphysics but who 
nevertheless is aware of the impressive status of the “no non-living composites” view fail 
to know that there are baseballs? 
 2 Introduction to metaphilosophical skepticism 
 In recent works I have explored this issue as it applies to hypotheses that have signifi cant 
empirical backing as well as philosophical interest. 2 In this essay I want to do two things: 
radically revise my treatment of the general case and then examine the extraordinary 
case when the anti-commonsensical hypothesis is “purely philosophical” in the sense 
that there is little or no straightforward scientifi c evidence for it and the reasons off ered 
in its defense come from purely philosophical thought alone—often but not exclusively 
metaphysics. Thus, for the most part I will set aside views such as color error theory (no 
ordinary physical objects are colored), which has signifi cant empirical backing, in order 
 2 In my 2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2010, and 2012. There has been excellent recent work on the general topic 
of the epistemic consequences of disagreement with epistemic peers (see the papers and references in this 
book as well as the Feldman and Warfi eld volume). In the cases examined in this essay, however, the disagree-
ment lies with one’s admitted epistemic superiors, not peers. On the face of it, it’s more of a challenge to 
rationally retain one’s view in the presence of disagreement with multiple recognized epistemic superiors 
than a single peer. 
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to focus on purely philosophical matters such as compositional nihilism (there are 
no composite objects;  Rosen and Dorr  2002 , Sider ms.), artifact nihilism (there are 
no artifacts; van  Inwagen  1990 ,  Merricks  2001 ), moral error theory (there are no 
positive, fi rst-order, substantive moral truths;  Mackie  1977 ), mathematical error the-
ory (there are no positive, fi rst-order, substantive mathematical truths;  Field  1980 , 
 Field  1989 ,  Balaguer  1998 ), semantic nihilism (no assertions made with or beliefs 
expressed with vague terms are true;  Sider and Braun  2007 ), and radical skepticism 
(there is virtually no knowledge). 3 The line between the philosophical theses with little 
or no scientifi c backing and those with signifi cant scientifi c backing is usually consid-
ered to be generously fuzzy, but there are obvious examples on either side of the line. 
I focus here on the examples far on the philosophy side. 
 In evaluating metaphilosophical skepticism we need not evaluate the radical anti-
commonsensical philosophical theories themselves. Indeed, I will assume for the sake of 
argument that they are all false and the commonsensical beliefs listed earlier are all true. 
Clearly, appropriate awareness of the credentials of a false theory can still ruin one’s 
knowledge of a fact. Consider the Jupiter case again but now imagine that  all profes-
sional astronomers have long accepted the “over 200 moons” theory (and there are 
many of these astronomers, they are independent thinkers, and so forth). You become 
aware that there is unanimous favorable expert opinion on the “over 200 moons” theory. 
As before, you think that they must have made some mistake, and your  one and only 
 reason is that you think the idea that a planet could have over 200 moons is just plain 
nuts. In this case you don’t know that Jupiter has fewer than ten moons, even if against all 
odds your belief is true and the old evidence described in your childhood science texts 
was sound. 
 3 The renegade 
 In this section I present two conditions that the subject satisfi es in scientifi c cases like the 
one involving Jupiter’s moons. Then in the following two sections I’ll explain how the 
metaphilosophical skeptic uses these conditions in her argument to reach her new kind 
of skepticism. 
 The fi rst condition, immediately below, looks complicated but the idea behind it 
isn’t: all it’s really doing is making precise the vague thought that hypothesis H is taken 
by the signifi cant portion of the relevant specialists to be true, and person S (who is an 
amateur with respect to H) knows that fact about the specialists as well as the fact that 
H’s truth means P’s falsehood.
 Condition 1 : Person S is familiar with hypothesis H (e.g. “Jupiter has over 200 moons”) and 
with many of the issues surrounding H, including knowing the key facts that H is inconsist-
 3 Philosophers occasionally use “error theory” to refer not to the theories listed above but to subsidiary 
claims regarding how those theories can account for why common sense goes wrong.  
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ent with P 4 (e.g. “Jupiter has fewer than ten moons”) and that H is “live” in the following 
strong sense:
 (i)  For many years many of the best members of her contemporary intellectual community 
(e.g. professional astronomers who study the large bodies of our solar system) have 
thoroughly investigated H in order to determine whether it is true. 
 (ii)  H is judged to have an excellent chance to be true by a signifi cant number and percent-
age of the professionals in the fi eld(s) relevant to H. These same specialists also think that 
P is probably false, for the simple reasons that the evidence for H is also against P and H 
and P are obviously mutually inconsistent. 5 ,  6 
 (iii)  Many of the professionals who endorse (or nearly endorse) H and reject P are S’s 
 epistemic superiors with respect to the topics most relevant to H and P: they are 
generally more informed than S is on the topics involving H, they have more raw 
intelligence than she has, they have thought about and investigated whether H is 
true longer and in more depth than she has, they have thought about and investi-
gated the topics surrounding H longer and in more depth than she has, they are 
just as or even more intellectually careful than she is, they are no more relevantly 
biased than she is, and they have understood and fairly and thoroughly evaluated 
virtually all the evidence and reasons she has regarding H and P (and usually much 
additional evidence or reasons). 7 
 (iv)  Those professionals reached that favorable opinion of H and ~P based on  arguments 
for H and ~P that are highly respected even by professionals who reject H and 
endorse P. 
 A hypothesis needs a  lot of sociological support in order to satisfy (i)–(iv). For instance, 
merely being endorsed for years, by some excellent professionals, even internationally 
famous ones, will not mean that a hypothesis satisfi es (i)–(iv). Condition 1 is quite 
demanding—and keep in mind that it says that (i)–(iv) not only are true but person S 
 knows that they are true. For all the good press epistemicism, for instance, gets nowadays 
it might fail to satisfy (ii) (I suspect it does, but this is not an armchair matter). Further-
more, suppose that theory T was overwhelmingly voted the theory that is the best one 
we know of and the one that is most likely to be true. It might  still fail to satisfy (ii) because 
the voters could also consistently insist that although T is the best and most likely to be 
true, it is unlikely to be true. The voters could think that we are still quite far from 
 fi nding a theory that has any real chance at truth. (This won’t be the case in which one 
 4 In section 5 we will see that it’s not strictly necessary that H and P be logically incompatible.  
 5 Here and throughout I use “evidence” to include epistemic support provided by philosophical  argument, 
including a priori argument.  
 6 If A obviously entails ~B and X is evidence for A, this usually means that X is evidence against B. There 
might be exceptions, but they won’t apply to the cases at issue in which it’s clear to everyone involved in 
discussions regarding H and P that the evidence for H is also evidence against P.  
 7 These professionals I will occasionally refer to as “experts,” which means  only  that they satisfy (i)–(iv).  
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theory is simply the negation of another.) Even the so-called “advocates” of  T might 
not advocate its truth but its status as the best theory around in the sense of being the 
one on the shortest path to the truth. 
 When I say that S  knows that so-and-so is her epistemic superior with respect to the 
topics most relevant to H and P, I don’t mean she dwells on that fact whenever she 
refl ects on her belief in P. Nor do I mean that she has consciously thought about and 
explicitly accepted  each of the components of the above characterization of epistemic 
superiority. Although I don’t want any requirement that stringent, I do want something 
a bit stronger than “S is disposed to accept that so-and-so fi ts all the superiority circum-
stances in (iii) from Condition 1.” I want something highly realistic, something that 
actually applies to many of us philosophers who are confi dent enough to disagree with 
David Lewis regarding some metaphysical claim, say, and yet wise and refl ective enough 
to readily admit that he knew and understood quite a bit more than we do regarding the 
topics directly relevant to the claim in question. I want to pick out an epistemic situation 
we often  actually fi nd ourselves in when we contemplate how our views confl ict with 
those had by people we know full well to be better philosophers than we are in these 
areas. But I’m not sure what that really amounts to; as a result I won’t off er  stipulations 
regarding “epistemic superior” or “knows that so-and-so is S’s epistemic superior.” 
 Perhaps something along these lines conveys the relevant kind of awareness of dis-
agreement in the face of epistemic superiority:
 • I have consciously recognized that Lewis believes the opposite of what I believe. 
 • I am disposed to accept virtually all of the conditions in the characterization of 
epistemic superiority with respect to P, applied to Lewis and myself ( part (iii) of 
Condition 1). 
 • I am disposed to admit that Lewis is my epistemic superior while simultaneously 
realizing that we disagree regarding P. 
 I may not have ever actually said, all in one breath, “Lewis is my epistemic superior 
regarding P but I’m right and he’s wrong about P,” but I have admitted in one way or 
another all three conditions on several occasions. The fundamental problem—I seem 
epistemically problematic in continuing to believe P—is worse, perhaps, if I have asserted 
all the parts of (iii) in one breath. But even without the simultaneous assertion, I don’t 
look too good. 
 When I say that we admit that so-and-so is our epistemic superior on a certain topic 
or individual claim, I mean to rule out the situation in which you think a group of 
“experts” are frauds or massively deluded in spite of the fact that they are more intelligent 
than you are and have thought about H much longer than you have. If you think they are 
deluded, then you will hardly count them as your epistemic superiors. For instance, sup-
pose there is a large group of people with high “raw intelligence” who formulate and 
examine all sorts of very complicated astrological theories. You don’t understand even 
10 per cent of what they are talking about, but you won’t take them to be your epistemic 
superiors on the task of knowing the future because you think they are, well, idiots. 
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 But there are other cases where you don’t think the people in question are deluded 
even though you disagree with them on a massive scale. For instance, suppose you are an 
atheistic philosopher who respects the work done in the portion of the philosophy of 
religion that takes theism for granted.  You look at the philosophical work on the trinity, 
for instance, and admire its philosophical quality—at least in some sense. The scholars 
are grappling with the three-in-one problem of God, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit. As an 
atheist, you probably think this is a one-in-one issue, as neither God nor the Holy Spirit 
exists. Will you consider these scholars your epistemic superiors on the topic of the trin-
ity, or on some specifi c claim C on that topic such as “The oneness in question is not 
numerical identity”? 
 Recall that one of the conditions on “recognized epistemic superiority” is this: you 
have to know that the superior is no more relevantly  biased than you are. If you strongly 
believe that the trinity-believers are more biased than you are when it comes to reli-
gious matters, then of course they won’t satisfy that part of (iii); so, you won’t consider 
them superiors. You escape the skeptic’s snare. But even if you thought that they are no 
more relevantly biased than you are, they still might not satisfy another part of (iii): you 
have to know that they are  more informed than you are on the topics involving the claim 
C. If you are an atheist, then in one pertinent sense you will consider any theist to be 
much less informed about C and other religious matters compared to yourself, since 
you will think that almost all of her interesting religious beliefs are false (or based on 
false presuppositions). But in another sense you will judge her to be your epistemic 
superior on religious matters, and even particular claim C, as she knows a lot more about 
religion and various theories of the trinity than you do.  You will also take her to know, 
or at least justifi ably believe, many more  conditionals  regarding religion and the trinity 
than you do (e.g. “If God has quality X, then according to view Y Christ must have qual-
ity Z”). Presumably, most of these conditionals have never even occurred to you, as you 
think the topic is bunk and as a result don’t stay abreast of research into the trinity.  These 
observations show that we have to be careful how we understand “relevant matters” and 
“informed” as they occur in (iii). How they apply to the philosophical cases we’re inter-
ested in is a topic for section 6. 
 Here is a preview of what the skeptic’s argument will be like. On the face of it, when 
S learns about her epistemic superiors, as in Condition 1, S’s belief in P now faces a 
 threat : she’s got good reason to think her belief is false. If that threat is not neutralized, 
then her belief in P won’t amount to knowledge. But Condition 2, which I’ll get to 
immediately below, suggests that she has nothing that neutralizes the threat. Therefore, 
her belief in P no longer amounts to knowledge. That is the very rough line of argument 
the skeptic will use although I will be off ering signifi cant changes to every bit of it, espe-
cially the conclusion. 
 In order to introduce Condition 2, suppose that Condition 1 applies to subject S. 
That is, S knows full well that a large percentage of the numerous relevant professionals 
agree that H is true and P is false and that they have this opinion as the result of epis-
temically upstanding research over many years; further, S knows that she is no expert 
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on any of these matters. We can suppose that the metaphilosophical skeptic is right to 
think that in these circumstances S has strong evidence that there is strong evidence for 
H and against P. In spite of all that, S might still know that her belief P is true, that the 
contrary hypothesis H is false, and that all those top professionals are just plain wrong. 
There are several ways S might still know those three things. First, S might know that 
she has some impressive evidence or other epistemically relevant item that the pros 
don’t have or have insuffi  ciently appreciated. This might be some evidence for P and 
against H. Or, S might have some rare evidence that shows that the evidence for H is 
fatally fl awed, even though the facts about expert opinion strongly suggested that that 
evidence for H was good. These possibilities are consistent with the truth of Condition 
1 applied to S. I’ll be going over these and other possibilities when we turn to the 
philosophical cases. Condition 2 closes off  some but not all of these possibilities:
 Condition 2 : If S knows of any evidence or other epistemically relevant items that seem to cast 
doubt on H, ~P, or the alleged evidence for H, then such items, if carefully, competently, and 
fairly considered by the members of her community of professionals who are thoroughly famil-
iar with H and P (including her recognized epistemic superiors on the relevant topics), would 
be nearly universally and confi dently judged to off er only quite weak evidence against H, ~P, 
and the alleged evidence for H. (In fact, very often even the specialists on H who  agree with S 
that H is false and P is true would say as much.) 
 I designed Condition 2 to fi t the following type of case (it may need fi ddling with). Pre-
tend you are a graduate student in paleontology who is aware of several rival hypotheses 
about the demise of the dinosaurs and who happens to believe the true meteor hypoth-
esis: a meteor wiped out the dinosaurs. Your PhD supervisor asks what you plan to say 
about alternative hypothesis H in your dissertation (H might be the hypothesis that the 
dinosaurs were wiped out by a series of supervolcano eruptions).  You say that that the-
ory isn’t very plausible but you’re happy to throw in a section showing why it’s implau-
sible. She  agrees with you that the meteor hypothesis is correct and H is false but she asks 
you what you plan to say against H. You give your spiel and she tells you fl at out that 
what you’ve said is inadequate and you should either do much better with a more criti-
cal section or drop it entirely and say in a footnote that you’ll be merely assuming the 
falsehood of H. After all, professor so-and-so right down the hall is an advocate of H, he’s 
certainly no dope, he isn’t alone in his expert opinion, and you’ve off ered nothing that 
puts any pressure on his view or his reasons for his view. 
 Condition 2 is saying that the experts who accept H and reject P (as well as the 
specialists who are agnostic on both H and P) know of S’s evidence and other epis-
temically relevant items that do or might support P or ~H.  They haven’t overlooked 
anything S has —just like in the graduate student case above. But just because they 
haven’t missed anything doesn’t mean that S fails to have an epistemic item that suf-
fi ces for knowledge of P and ~H: there remains the possibility that they  underestimated 
the epistemic signifi cance of some of S’s epistemic items of relevance to P and H. In 
the cases we’re interested in, in which S is a philosopher, H is a purely philosophical 
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error theory, and P is an ordinary commonsensical claim, this epistemic item that 
S has need not be an  argument that  suffi  ces for knowledge of P—at least, it need not be 
a dialectically eff ective argument. But our epistemic items go beyond our argumenta-
tive-persuasive abilities, especially if epistemological externalism is true. 
 Call the person who satisfi es Conditions 1 and 2 a  well-informed mere mortal with 
respect to H. She is  well informed because she is aware of H, H’s good status, and the rela-
tion of H to P; she is a  mere mortal because, roughly put, she has no epistemic item 
regarding H and P that the experts have overlooked or would not reject and she knows 
that the advocates for H and ~P are her epistemic superiors on those topics. The gradu-
ate student in paleontology is a well-informed mere mortal, “mere mortal” for short. 
A child and any adult unfamiliar with the fi eld relevant to H are not, as they fail to satisfy 
any of the demanding epistemic requirements of Condition 1. Another kind of mere 
mortal is an expert in the general fi eld but whose specialization lies elsewhere. Professor 
Smith teaches various paleontology classes. She is perfectly aware of H but wouldn’t be 
able to say anything interesting against it. She has the true meteor-killed-the-dinosaurs 
belief but like the graduate student her belief is too lucky (in some sense) to amount to 
knowledge. That’s the type of person I have in mind as a well-informed mere mortal. 
I hope that Conditions 1 and 2 capture the important aspects of her epistemic position. 
 The  renegade is the well-informed mere mortal who retains her belief in P. She is the 
target of the metaphilosophical skeptic’s argument. 
 I would be surprised if “S believes P” wasn’t polysemous. So, it is important that we 
not get confused regarding the notion of belief that is relevant here. When you’re asked 
“What is your take on P?” it seems that in at least some conversational contexts, espe-
cially ones concerning philosophical questions, you are being asked to take the fi rst-
order, direct evidence you know of regarding P and announce how it strikes you as 
bearing on P. You are not being asked to give your considered judgment on all sources of 
evidence or take into account what anyone else thinks. Instead, you’re being asked for 
something like your phenomenological intellectual reaction to that limited body of 
evidence. You’re being asked this: when you consider this body of considerations, in 
which direction are you inclined: P, ~P, or neither? Never mind whether you “follow” or 
“give in” to that inclination, thereby coming to accept P for instance; that’s another issue 
entirely. Correlative with this task of responding to “What is your take on P?” is a notion 
of belief that is similarly restricted. When you reply with “I believe P is true” you are not 
off ering an objective assessment but rather a subjective reaction:  here is the doxastic direc-
tion in which I happen to fi nd myself moved when I weigh those considerations . 
 This is not an unrefl ective notion of belief, as it might be the result of years of study, 
but it’s still a mere doxastic inclination in response to fi rst-order evidence. Neither is it a 
weakly held belief, as the inclination in question might be very strong. 
 I fi nd that a great many highly intelligent students interpret philosophical questions 
in this manner. I fi nd it fascinating, partly because I fi nd it foreign. I have the doxastic 
inclinations like everyone else, but I never thought of them as being  beliefs . It took me 
years to fi gure it out, but I now suspect that when I ask my students for their beliefs 
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regarding a view or argument what they  hear is often something along the line described 
above. In particular, when I go over basic issues in the epistemology of disagreement in a 
classroom there always are a bunch of students who are initially completely puzzled as to 
why disagreement with other people over philosophical issues should have  any relevance 
at all to the epistemic status of their own opinions—even when I tell them that almost 
every philosopher in the world disagrees with them (as the case may be). Contrary to 
popular belief among philosophy teachers, these students aren’t closet relativists or any-
thing like that; they just interpret the notion of philosophical belief diff erently from me. 
I have also met professional philosophers who seem to have the same notion of belief in 
mind. This inclination-fi rst-order notion of belief even shows up in scientifi c contexts. 
For instance, I have had plenty of students hear the questions “Was there a beginning to 
the physical universe?” and “Assuming there was a beginning, did it have a cause?” in this 
inclination-fi rst-order manner. I suspect that people hear a question in that peculiar 
manner when (i) they are aware of some relevant fi rst-order considerations regarding P, 
so they have some considerations to work with when responding to the question (e.g. 
unless they are astronomers they will  not hear the question “How many moons does 
Jupiter have?” in this way), and (ii) either they think the question is highly philosophical 
or they think the relevant experts have come to no consensus, so they are free to ignore 
them entirely. 
 In any case, I am examining the case when the philosopher’s  considered judgment (not 
doxastic inclination) of  all the relevant considerations (not just the fi rst-order ones) is 
that P is true.  A worry here, which I don’t know how to fi nesse, is that the inclination-
fi rst-order notion of belief might be very common among philosophers who are 
voicing opinions outside their specialty areas, if not across the board. If Jen doesn’t do 
any extensive research on free will or determinism, and you ask her what her “take” is 
on that topic, she might say “I am incompatibilist” even though all she is reporting is 
the direction of her inclination after gazing at the fi rst-order evidence she is aware of. 
If this notion of belief is especially common, then the scope of metaphilosophical 
skepticism is thereby diminished, but only at the cost of drastically reducing the scope 
of “full” philosophical belief. 
 4 The metaphilosophical skeptic’s principles 
 As I conceive the matter, the metaphilosophical skeptic is convinced that there is  some-
thing epistemically bad about what the renegade is doing: when the well-informed mere 
mortal retains her belief, then she has thereby gone wrong in some important epistemic 
respect. Notice that the focus is on something the renegade  does , an intellectual reaction 
to the discovery of being a renegade. Thus, the skeptic’s thesis is just this:  the renegade’s 
action of retaining her belief is seriously epistemically defi cient . The skeptic thinks that this 
 epistemic defect holds of the renegade almost no matter what the true story of know-
ledge, justifi cation, evidence, reason, and epistemic blame/permissibility turns out to 
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be, and it holds for virtually any renegade, regardless of her particular circumstances 
(e.g. the  specifi c H and P involved, the manner in which the belief in P was formed, 
whether S’s belief in P initially amounted to knowledge, and so forth). Therefore, she 
does not hold her thesis as a result of some complicated epistemological theory (e.g. 
“Assuming the truth of internalism and evidentialism . . .”); she thinks it follows from 
general principles that  virtually any epistemological theory will embrace. As a result, she 
needs to be fl exible regarding the nature of the “serious epistemic defect,” as it can’t be 
captive to the truth of how evidence, knowledge, and warrant are related (for instance). 
Only when I’m fi nished with the argument for her thesis will we be in a position to see 
how to interpret this “defect” in this fl exible way. 
 In order to introduce the fi rst principle the skeptic will use in her argument, suppose that 
Condition 1 is true of person S. On the face of it, this means that her epistemic superiors 
have some evidence that she doesn’t have—evidence that must be pretty strong since it 
convinced the superiors that the renegade’s belief P is false. But there are other possibilities. 
Maybe they have the same evidence as S but have “digested” that evidence properly whereas 
S has not. And due to that diff erence, they have seen that the evidence points toward P’s 
falsehood, not truth. Then again, maybe S isn’t defi cient in either of those ways (namely, 
lacking evidence or improperly digesting the commonly held evidence) but has made 
some calculation error that her superiors avoided. (This might happen if P is the answer to 
some arithmetic problem.) A calculation error doesn’t seem like the evidential mistakes in 
the fi rst two possibilities, at least according to my understanding of “evidence.” 
 For my primary purpose in this essay—the application of the principles below to 
philosophers—I know of no relevant diff erence between the fi rst two possibilities. Fur-
ther, the possibility of a calculation error won’t apply to virtually any philosophical case, 
since very few if any philosophical disagreements pivot on calculation errors. 
 There are other possibilities of course. Perhaps S disagrees with her superiors because 
of a diff erence in “starting points,” and not anything about evidence or calculation. There 
are various ways of understanding starting points. But I think that it is easy to overempha-
size their importance. For instance, if I’m an epistemologist who doesn’t work on 
vagueness or the philosophy of language and logic generally, then when I fi nd out that 
a large number and percentage of the specialists in the philosophy of logic and language 
endorse some anti-commonsensical view regarding vagueness (e.g. supervaluationism, 
epistemicism, non-classical logic) after many years of rigorous investigation, the obvious 
thing for me to conclude, by far, is that they must have some decent arguments for their 
view—arguments I don’t know about  and that must be pretty impressive given that they 
have actually turned so many quality philosophers against common sense. On the face of 
it, there is no reason to think there is some mysterious diff erence in “starting points,” 
whatever they are supposed to be, that is leading them against common sense. 
 In any case, here is the fi rst principle:
 Evidence of Evidence (Ev-of-Ev): if Condition 1 is true of person S, then S has strong evidence E 
1
 
regarding her recognized epistemic superiors (her knowledge of the various socio-epistemic 
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facts about top professional endorsement, such as the four parts of Condition 1) that either 
(1) there is evidence E 
2
 (e.g. astronomical evidence) that S doesn’t have or has underappreciated, 
that her recognized superiors have, and that strongly supports the idea that H is true and P is 
false (after all, it actually convinced many of those superiors that H is true and P is false), or 
(2) S has made a relevant calculation error that the superiors have avoided. 
 I chose the name of the principle based on the view that disjunct (2) will not play a role 
in what follows. 
 Suppose Homer knows that Sherlock Holmes has an excellent track record in mur-
der investigations; he knows that Holmes is investigating the murder of the maid; he 
then hears Holmes announce after a long investigation that he has done as thorough a 
job as he has ever done and that the butler defi nitely did it. At that point  Homer acquires 
excellent evidence E 
1
 (Holmes’ word and track record) that there is excellent evidence E 
2
 
(the “detective evidence” Holmes uncovered in his investigation, evidence Homer has 
yet to hear) that the butler did it. Ev-of-Ev is an extension of that idea, applying it to a 
community of top professionals (instead of just one person, as in the Holmes case). 
 What if Homer  is the butler, Homer is innocent, and he knows perfectly well that he’s 
innocent? I don’t think anything changes. Homer still has excellent evidence E 
1
 that 
Holmes has excellent evidence E 
2
 that he, Homer, killed the maid. It’s just that Homer 
also has  other evidence regarding the situation. His evidence that he didn’t kill the maid 
is much, much stronger than Holmes’ evidence E 
2
 , at least under any ordinary circum-
stances. Now, if Holmes revealed to Homer that Homer’s memory of the relevant par-
ticulars was incredibly bad, then Homer would begin to take seriously Holmes’ strong 
detective evidence E 
2
 that Homer committed the crime, as his own evidence that he’s 
innocent—from memory—would now be undermined. 
 Ev-of-Ev says that when there is a  signifi cant  number and percentage (both of those) 
of  relevant people who endorse H, where H is obviously inconsistent with commonsen-
sical belief P, then E 
1
 is  strong evidence that there is  strong evidence E 
2
 that H is true and 
P is false (where S lacks or has underappreciated E 
2
 and the superiors have E 
2
 ). I’ve 
already addressed my use of “relevant” in parts (ii)–(iv) of Condition 1. Now I will say a 
few things about the uses of “signifi cant” and “strong.” 
 The use of “signifi cant” comes from part (ii) of Condition 1. One is tempted to 
ask “How  large a percentage and number is signifi cant?” I think this might be like asking 
“How much money do I have to lose before I’m no longer rich?” or, more to the point, 
“How much evidence do I need before I’m justifi ed in thinking the butler did it?” Sup-
pose that H is the hypothesis that there are no composite artifacts and P is the claim that 
I have four baseballs in the trunk of my car. If there are 10,000 metaphysicians and 
 philosophers of physics in the world and 90 per cent of them say H and ~P are true or 
quite likely to be true (and there is no funny business, such as “There was just one of 
them a year ago and he cloned himself 9,999 times”), then it looks as though the conse-
quent of Ev-of-Ev is pretty reasonable. If there are just six in the world and fi ve say H 
and ~P are true, then the consequent of Ev-of-Ev isn’t plausible (good percentage but 
sample size too small). If there are 10,000 of them and just 16 per cent say H 
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and ~P, then the  consequent of Ev-of-Ev is much less plausible (good sample size but 
 percentage too small) unless there are extenuating circumstances (e.g. the 16 per cent 
are the clear superiors of the 84 per cent). 8 I doubt whether there are any magic num-
bers that would make the following statement reasonable: “Ev-of-Ev is true only when 
‘signifi cant’ picks out a number greater than A and percentage greater than B.” 
 The reason S has for thinking his belief is false is a  strong reason, something that 
makes it highly likely that the belief is false. I doubt whether a probabilistic reading 
of “strong reason” is appropriate here, but something along that line is in order. If you 
want to make it more precise, think of cases from science or mathematics. With 
respect to the Jupiter story, you fi rst acquired knowledge of the fact that a large 
number and percentage of astronomers endorse the “over 200 moons” theory. You 
rightly took that information, E 
1
 , to be excellent evidence that there is some evi-
dence E 
2
 that (a) you don’t have, (b) they do have, and (c) strongly supports the “over 
200 moons” theory. 
 We can now introduce the rest of the principles she uses in her argument. To begin, 
assume that S believes P, S satisfi es Condition 1, Ev-of-Ev is true, and the possibility of a 
relevant calculation error is remote. Then this claim follows:
 (i)  S has strong evidence E 
1
 regarding her recognized epistemic superiors that there 
is evidence E 
2
 that S doesn’t have or has underappreciated, that her recognized 
superiors have, and that strongly supports the idea that H is true and P is false. 
 It’s natural to think that the truth of (i) means that S faces an epistemic “threat” to her 
belief in P. We are familiar with defeaters and defeater-defeaters. For instance, you start 
out believing P, learn some fact Q that suggests P is false or that your evidence for P is 
inadequate (so Q is a defeater), but then you learn yet another fact R that shows that Q 
is false or your evidence for Q is inadequate (so R is a defeater-defeater). Something 
similar applies in S’s case. Although her learning E 
1
 presents a threat to her belief P, 
or so the skeptic claims, we can easily imagine that she has some extra information that 
“overwhelms” E 
1
 . (I brought up these possibilities when discussing Condition 2 earlier.) 
If she has that extra information (that in some sense overwhelms E 
1
 ), then she is not 
epistemically defi cient in any way in retaining her belief in P. Moreover, it seems that 
in order to avoid all epistemic defi ciency in retaining P she  must have some epistemic 
“item” (evidence, reason, reliability, etc.) that overwhelms E 
1
 ; it’s not just an option. The 
next  principle makes this idea explicit:
 Evidence & ~Skepticism → Defeater (Ev&~Sk→D): if S has strong evidence E 
1
 regarding her recog-
nized epistemic superiors that there is evidence E 
2
 that S doesn’t have or has underappreciated, 
that her recognized superiors have, and that strongly supports the idea that H is true and P is 
false, then if in spite of having E 
1
 her retaining her belief in P suff ers no serious epistemic defect, 
then she must have some epistemic item that overwhelms E 
1
 . 
 8 The “unless” clause is important in practice. For instance, the percentage of philosophers who endorse 
the anti-commonsensical epistemicism increases greatly with familiarity of the relevant topics.  
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 At this early stage we leave open what this item might be (e.g. evidence, reason,  reliability, 
etc.) and what it means for it to “overwhelm” E 
1
 . 9 Later we will look at concrete propos-
als. The skeptic says that since (i) and Ev&~Sk→D are true, we have the result that if S 
escapes metaphilosophical skepticism, then she has some item that cancels out E 
1
 . 
 But remember that S satisfi es Condition 2, which according to the skeptic makes it 
unlikely that S has any item that makes her escape the skeptical pit. Here we are appeal-
ing to a principle that allows exceptions:
 Condition 2 → No Defeater (2→~D): if S satisfi es Condition 2, then it’s highly likely that S fails to 
have any epistemic item that “overwhelms” E 
1
 . 
 When we add that principle to what we have already concluded about S’s belief in P, 
we get the result that it’s highly likely that S is caught in the skeptical snare: her retaining 
her belief in P is seriously epistemically defi cient. Again, what the “serious epistemic 
defect” is will be addressed below in section 12. 
 5 The metaphilosophical skeptic’s argument 
 Here is the  positive argument schema for metaphilosophical skepticism, which uses the 
material from the previous section (the  negative arguments, which consists of responses 
to objections, are in sections 6–11):
 (a) A large number and percentage of the members of our intellectual community 
of contemporary philosophers and their advanced students satisfy Condition 1 
with respect to some claims P and H. Moreover, the philosophers are renegades 
with respect to those claims: they think P is true. 
 (b) Ev-of-Ev is true for the cases mentioned in (a): if Condition 1 is true of one of 
the philosophers mentioned in (a), then she has strong evidence E 
1
 regarding 
her recognized epistemic superiors that either (1) there is evidence E 
2
 that she 
doesn’t have or has underappreciated, that her recognized superiors have, and 
that strongly supports the idea that H is true and her contrary belief P is false, or 
(2) she has made a relevant calculation error that the superiors have avoided. 
 (c) But in the case of the philosophers and theories mentioned in (a), possibility (2) 
from (b) is not realized. 
 (d) Thus, by (a)–(c) each of the philosophers mentioned in (a) has strong evidence 
E 
1
 regarding her recognized epistemic superiors that there is evidence E 
2
 that she 
doesn’t have or has underappreciated, that her recognized superiors have, and that 
strongly supports the idea that H is true and the contrary belief P is false. 
 (e) Ev&~Sk→D is true for the cases mentioned in (a): if one of the philosophers 
mentioned in (a) has strong evidence E 
1
 regarding her recognized epistemic 
 9 I am not saying that the item in question has to be a  defeater as currently understood in the literature; 
I just couldn’t think of a better term to use in the principle. What the item may amount to will become clear 
in section 11.  
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superiors that there is evidence E 
2
 that she doesn’t have or has underappreciated, 
that her recognized superiors have, and that strongly supports the idea that H is 
true and the contrary belief P is false, then if in spite of having E 
1
 her retaining 
her belief P suff ers no serious epistemic defect, then she must have some epis-
temic item that overwhelms E 
1
 . 
 (f  ) Thus, by (d) and (e) for each of the philosophers mentioned in (a), if in spite of 
having E 
1
 her retaining her belief P suff ers no serious epistemic defect, then she 
must have some epistemic item that overwhelms E 
1
 . 
 (g) But most of the philosophers mentioned in (a) satisfy Condition 2 with respect 
to H: if they have or know of any evidence or other epistemically relevant items 
that  seem to cast doubt on H, or the negation of P, or the evidence the advocates 
of H have for H, then such items, if carefully, expertly, and fairly considered by 
the members of her community of professionals who are thoroughly familiar 
with the relevant issues, would be nearly universally and confi dently rejected as 
insuffi  cient to rule out H, the evidence for H, or the negation of P. 
 (h) 2→~D is true for the cases mentioned in (a): if one of the philosophers in (a) 
satisfi es Condition 2, then it’s highly likely that she fails to have any epistemic 
item that “overwhelms” E 
1
 . 
 (i) Thus, by (f )–(h) it’s highly likely that her retaining her belief P suff ers a serious 
epistemic defect. 
 In what follows I am going to assume without argument that the argument (a)–(i) is 
sound for hypotheses that are live in virtue of scientifi c evidence (“scientifi cally live” so 
to speak): when the live hypothesis that confl icts with your belief fi rmly belongs to sci-
ence, then your retaining your renegade belief is seriously epistemically defective. So the 
argument is assumed to work in the Jupiter case. My project in the rest of this essay is 
threefold: present the case that the argument is sound for ordinary philosophical dis-
agreements (that don’t go violently against common sense), present the case that the 
argument is sound for the error theory cases, and see what follows from the hypothesis 
that metaphilosophical skepticism is false in the error theory cases. 
 The objector to the metaphilosophical skeptic needs to defend her claim that only 
scientifi c liveness and mere mortality, and not purely philosophical liveness and mere 
mortality, are strong enough to generate a skeptical result. She needs, in other words, to 
point out some  relevant epistemological diff erence between science and philosophy, 
one that shows that purely philosophical liveness and mere mortality is epistemically 
impotent. There are loads of diff erences of course, even interesting epistemological 
ones. The goal is to fi nd an epistemological one that  justifi es the thought that the argu-
ment fails for purely philosophical hypotheses even though it’s sound for scientifi c 
hypotheses. 10 
 10 There are many objections to metaphilosophical skepticism (e.g. no one is forced to bite the bullets 
error theorists bite) that I won’t deal with because they fail to even suggest any weakness in the original 
argument or thesis.  
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 6 Comments on premise (a) 
 Premise (a), which says that the renegade situation occurs in philosophy, is pretty clearly 
true for many philosophers and philosophical claims. I can think of just two objections. 
Here is the fi rst:
 The metaphilosophical skeptic is assuming that there are philosophical experts, just like there are 
astronomical experts. But this is a dubious assumption. For instance, if there are philosophical 
experts, then one would think that both Dennett and Chalmers are experts in the philosophy 
of consciousness. But given the diversity of their views on consciousness, at least one of them is 
almost completely wrong about the nature of consciousness, thereby ruining his chance at 
expertise. And if virtually no one is an expert on material composition or vagueness, for instance, 
then the fact that a signifi cant number and percentage of those non-experts endorse radical 
error theories doesn’t mean that there is strong evidence for those theories. 
 The idea here is vague, but I assume the objection is targeting Condition 1, which could 
be crudely summarized with “Person S knows that lots of the  experts disagree with her.” 
However, in the careful presentation of the metaphilosophical skeptic’s argument there 
is no mention of philosophical “experts.”  The closest claim occurs in part (iii) in Condi-
tion 1:
 Many of the professionals who endorse H and reject P are generally more informed than S is on 
the topics involving H, they have more raw intelligence than she has, they have thought and 
investigated whether H is true longer and in more depth than she has, they have thought about 
and investigated the topics surrounding H longer and in more depth than she has, they are just 
as or even more intellectually careful than she is, they are no more relevantly biased than she is, 
and they have understood and fairly and thoroughly evaluated virtually all the evidence and 
reasons she has regarding P (and usually much additional evidence or reasons). 
 Whether the philosophers described count as “experts” depends on what one means by 
that vague term. In any case, there is no reason I know of for thinking that this epistemic 
condition isn’t known to be satisfi ed for many of us with regard to many of our philo-
sophical beliefs (setting skepticism aside). 
 Here is another objection to (a):
 Even our best and brightest are utterly epistemically ill-equipped to fi nd the truth regarding the 
philosophical problems that we all work on. We are intelligent enough to pose questions that we 
are incapable of answering. We might as well be young children wondering what it’s like to be 
married for fi fty years. In some sense the twenty year old is in a better position than the eight 
year old, but since both are so far from epistemic adequacy, part (iii) of Condition 1 doesn’t 
really apply to anyone in philosophical matters, as we are all about equally awful when it comes 
to investigating philosophical questions. 
 Sometimes I am inclined to accept this depressing view. (  Why else are we discussing the 
very same things Aristotle investigated so many centuries ago, and in largely the same 
terms?) But if it’s true, then surely metaphilosophical skepticism is true too, even if the 
argument for that thesis given above fails. 
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 I conclude that premise (a) is true for many philosophers and their philosophical 
beliefs. The only wrinkle is whether it is true for error theories, the extreme case. In the 
rest of this section I argue that it is true for those theories. 
 To begin, I’m stipulating that the philosophical hypotheses are genuine  error  theories. 11 
For instance, as I understand them compositional nihilism and artifact nihilism say three 
things: there are no laptops; all ordinary occurrences of “I have a laptop,” “Laptops exist,” 
“Some laptops are over $1000” are all just plain false;  and ordinary people have the 
 corresponding ordinary false beliefs about laptops (so it isn’t the case that the sentences 
are all false but our beliefs have some fancy semantics that makes them true even when 
“properly” expressed by the false sentences). Theories that merely look error-theoretic 
about laptops (e.g. “Laptops exist and many cost about $800 but none of them  really 
exist, or exist in the fundamental sense,” or some contextualism on “exist” or “laptop”) 
are not to the point (e.g. the theories of Horgan and Potrč (2000) or Ross  Cameron 
( 2010 ) are probably not error theories in my sense). 12 I get to pick and choose among 
theories here, landing on the ones genuinely contrary to common sense. 
 Even with that clarifi cation, I can think of four promising objections to premise (a) 
applied to error theories. 13 
 First, some philosophers might be tempted to say “Well, no one really believes radi-
cal error theories that are genuinely inconsistent with common sense beliefs; so those 
theories are never live and Condition 1 is thereby not met”; such philosophers are mis-
informed. Please keep in mind that it is neither here nor there whether as a matter of 
contingent fact any of these particular genuine error theories is live right this minute; 
we should not be parochial. Philosophers will believe almost anything—even today, 
when the percentage of philosophers who endorse the truth of commonsense belief is 
peculiarly high, historically considered.  All one has to do is peruse philosophy journals 
from fi fty or hundred years ago to get a sense of how what seems obviously true in one 
era is judged obviously false in another era.  And in that exercise we are looking at just 
one century of the actual world. 
 Here is a second objection to premise (a) applied to error theories:
 Although I recognize the anti-commonsensical philosophers to be much more informed and pro-
ductive than I am when it comes to the topics in question, they aren’t my superiors when it comes 
to  evaluating those anti-commonsensical theories. David Lewis, for instance, might leave me in 
 11 Whether “error theory” can be defi ned is beside the point. I’m using that phrase to pick out the theo-
ries listed in the essay as well as others that similarly deny huge portions of beliefs that are nearly universal, 
in being commonsensical in almost all cultures throughout almost all history (including today).  
 12 Compositional nihilism strikes some people as incoherent: it says that there are some particles arranged 
tree-wise, it says that there are no trees, and yet this conjunction is incoherent because the fi rst condition is 
metaphysically suffi  cient for the second condition. But that alleged metaphysical connection is denied by the 
nihilist. Nihilism might be necessarily false (like many philosophical theses) but it’s not obviously so.  
 13 Some objections clearly won’t work. Hegelians deny that we philosophers  ever disagree with one 
another in any “substantive” way ( Hegel  1995 ). A desperate move to say the least, despite suggesting deep 
thoughts about philosophical progress from a temporally wide perspective.  
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the dust when it comes to generating various worthwhile arguments, concepts, claims, and theories, 
but he is no better than me when it comes to determining whether those theories and claims are 
really true. In eff ect, there are far fewer mere mortals then the metaphilosophical skeptic thinks. 
 I suppose that view might be correct in a few isolated cases, but for the most part  people 
who are my philosophical superiors in all those ways will be better than I am at evaluating 
claims in the corresponding area. Take a particular case: vagueness. Timothy Williamson, 
Roy Sorenson, Hud Hudson, Paul Horwich, and other experts on vagueness are epistemi-
cists (in the possibility we’re envisioning, not to mention our actual present time). I, on the 
other hand, barely even  understand supervaluationism, how the “defi nitely” operator works 
or what it means, the issues relevant to Gareth Evans’ famous argument against vague iden-
tity, and so on. It’s silly to think that I’m anywhere near as good as Williamson, Sorenson, 
Horwich, Hudson, and the others in evaluating the pros and cons of epistemicism. While it 
is certainly possible that I stumble on an argument that they don’t know about or haven’t 
suffi  ciently appreciated that dooms their anti-commonsensical theory, we should stick with 
the  most common scenario , in which the mere mortal has not had the rare fortune to discover 
some crucial bit of evidence that all the anti-commonsensical philosophical experts have 
missed or failed to suffi  ciently appreciate. Part (iii) of Condition 1 in particular is defi nitely 
true of me with respect to the topic of vagueness (as well as many other topics that generate 
radical error theories) and there is nothing exceptional about that fact. 
 A third objection says that there are no “genuine” error theories as characterized 
 earlier. Consider the following rough train of thought.
 When people “accept” a certain claim in ordinary life, do they think it’s  literally true or are they 
best interpreted as thinking that it’s  true for all practical purposes ? For the most part, they aren’t even 
aware of the contrast, so how do we interpret their assent to “There are four baseballs in the 
trunk”? (It won’t help to ask them, as they don’t know the diff erence.) And what kind of com-
mitment is suffi  cient for  belief  ? Does it have to be literal truth or just practical truth? Or is “belief” 
polysemous? Maybe it’s  indeterminate whether they have “literal belief” or “practical belief.” 
 One might take those and similar refl ections and (somehow) argue that charity of inter-
pretation requires us to say that although (a) the error theorist truly believes that there 
aren’t four baseballs in the trunk, (b) she truly believes that her belief is literally true, 
(c) the ordinary person truly believes that there are four baseballs in the trunk, and 
(d) she truly believes that her belief is literally true, “belief ” is polysemous and the two 
operative notions of belief diff er in such a way that there is no disagreement: the two 
baseball beliefs can both be true with no inconsistency (perhaps “true” is polysemous 
too). I don’t know how the argument for this combination of claims would go. For one 
thing, it hardly seems “charitable” to say that the error theorist isn’t disagreeing with the 
ordinary belief when she insists that she is denying the ordinary person’s baseball belief. 
But what if this no-disagreement view is true anyway? 
 These are deep waters, but I don’t think they matter to the metaphilosophical skep-
tic’s argument: strictly speaking, H need not be logically inconsistent with P. Consider 
again the Jupiter story. You think Jupiter has fewer than ten moons. You read in 
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the  science section of the  New York Times a long article detailing the fact that 95 per 
cent of astronomers have over the last quarter century come to think that Jupiter has 
over 200 moons. The article includes descriptions of the new methods used to come to 
the new consensus. However, it turns out that the reporter failed to understand that the 
astronomers are employing an alternative conception of a moon in such a way that their 
“over 200 moons” belief isn’t at all inconsistent with your “fewer than ten moons” 
belief. This diff erence in conceptions is missed by the reporter (imagine that). Even if all 
of that is true, it seems to me that in this situation you have still been presented with 
excellent evidence E 
1
 that there is excellent evidence E 
2
 against your belief (so premise 
(c) is true; thus, (a) can be altered so that H and P need not be logically inconsistent). It 
turns out that E 
2
 is not excellent evidence against your “fewer ten moons” belief even 
though it may be excellent evidence for the astronomers’ “over 200 moons” belief. But 
you have no evidence for that fact (the fact that E 
2
 is not excellent evidence against your 
belief ) and plenty of evidence against it. So even if the error theorists aren’t really dis-
agreeing with the ordinary person’s belief—or the amateur metaphysician’s belief—it 
seems that the lesson applies anyway, just as in the Jupiter case. 
 If the amateur philosopher  knows , or at least has good overall evidence, that her belief 
isn’t really contradicted by the error theorist’s theory, then perhaps she has not been 
presented with excellent evidence that there is signifi cant evidence against her com-
monsensical belief (as Ev-of-Ev says). But I am confi dent that not many philosophers 
are in such a position. So, even when the objection succeeds it will have vanishingly 
small signifi cance. Near the end of section 11 I will remark on the peculiar way that 
error theories deny common sense. 
 Now for the fourth objection to (a) applied to error theories. Assuming that there are 
genuine error theories and that they are often live, premise (a) makes the additional claim 
that many contemporary philosophers satisfy Condition 1 with respect to those error theo-
ries. But that last claim can be questioned. In section 3 I gave the trinity example, in which 
the atheistic philosopher will often think that some theistic philosophers are “more 
informed” than she is regarding the trinity, at least in two senses: they will know more about 
the various theories of the trinity and they will know many more conditional truths about 
the trinity. But in a more substantive sense of “informed,” the atheistic philosopher will 
judge the theistic philosophers to be  less informed than she is when it comes to the trinity: 
after all, she thinks there is no trinity to puzzle about (all there is is the one human, Jesus). 
 The reason this phenomenon is relevant is that some philosophers have similarly dis-
missive views to whole swaths of philosophical inquiry. For instance, some people think 
analytic metaphysics is nonsense all the way through. I once had a colleague who 
thought that epistemologists had nothing interesting to work on, and as a consequence 
was dismissive of the entire enterprise. These philosophers will not count as renegades 
with respect to theses in those philosophical areas, thereby escaping the metaphilo-
sophical skeptic’s argument. 
 I will off er just a few comments regarding these “dismissive” philosophers. First, I will 
be considering the possibility that many renegades have epistemic items—such as  Moorean 
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moves—that are suffi  cient to avoid metaphilosophical skepticism. It’s not the case that the 
only way to avoid skepticism is to think that Kit Fine and Ted Sider are not your epistemic 
superiors when it comes to material composition and persistence through time, Tim 
 Williamson and Paul Horwich aren’t your superiors regarding  vagueness, and so on. There 
is hope for the commonsensical philosopher even if she respects her colleagues and isn’t 
arrogant! Second, notice that the error theories aren’t all from metaphysics (although most 
are). Error theories show up in the philosophy of language and logic, the philosophy of 
mathematics, the philosophy of mind, metaethics, and the philosophy of physics as well. 
And don’t forget traditional skepticism, which is an epistemological error theory. So, in 
order to escape the clutches of Condition 1 via the dismissive attitude, a philosopher 
would have to be dismissive of an enormous portion of philosophy. Although I won’t 
argue the matter here, I strongly suspect the cure is worse than the disease: the epistemic 
sin of rejecting the relevant areas of philosophy (thereby avoiding the metaphilosophical 
skeptic’s snare) is larger than the epistemic sin of being a well-informed mere mortal who 
retains her commonsensical beliefs. Furthermore, one will be faced with the task of 
responding to the objection that one’s own philosophizing is hardly better than that found 
in the dismissed areas. Indeed, it is diffi  cult for me to see how an informed philosopher 
could be epistemically responsible in dismissing any  one of the areas that the error theories 
fall into, let alone all of them. For instance, all one has to do in order to see the merit in 
various odd theories in metaphysics is spend a few months thinking about the Statue-Clay 
case, the Tibbles-Tib case, the Ship of Theseus case, the problem of the many, and a few 
other puzzles (see sections 1–3 of  chapter  5 of  Sider  2001 for an introduction to some of 
these issues). To see the merit in inconsistency views of truth spend a few months grap-
pling with the semantic paradoxes. I’ll consider the Moorean move in section 11. 
 7 Comments on premise (b) 
 Premise (b), which is Ev-of-Ev, says that if Condition 1 applies to S, then S has superb evi-
dence E 
1
 (her knowledge of facts about “expert” endorsement) that there is strong evi-
dence E 
2
 (e.g. philosophical arguments) that H is true and P is false. This principle should 
not be terribly controversial. It doesn’t mean that S should think that E 
2
 is  really is strong 
evidence; it doesn’t even say E 
2
 exists. S might have other evidence E 
3
 that suggests—or 
even proves—that E 
2
 is quite weak or non-existent, where E 
3
 is more impressive than E 
1
 . 
For instance, S might know of some relevant fact that the superiors possess but have failed 
to suffi  ciently appreciate. (Though Condition 2 will close this possibility off .) S might 
know that although a signifi cant number and percentage (say 65 per cent) of the relevant 
superiors think H is true and P is false, a whopping 100 per cent of the thirty or so superi-
ors commonly acknowledged to be the  most knowledgeable about H and P are fi rmly 
convinced that H is false and P is true—despite the fact that these thirty philosophers are 
fi ercely independent thinkers who disagree with one another all the time on many related 
issues. In such a case S can quite reasonably (not to say truthfully) conclude that the many 
advocates of (H & ~P) have made some error somewhere that in turn  their epistemic 
philosophical renegades 143
 superiors have noticed, even though S might not have the slightest idea what it is. (This is 
similar to the Jupiter case with the small number of renegade astronomers.) So S starts out 
 knowing P, becomes a bit concerned when she fi nds that 65 per cent of the superiors think 
~P (since she has been presented with good sociological evidence E 
1
 that there’s good 
philosophical evidence E 
2
 against her belief ), but then is reassured when she later learns 
that 100 per cent of the top philosophers independently think P (as she has now been pre-
sented with good sociological evidence E 
3
 that the philosophical evidence E 
2
 against her 
belief has been neutralized). In this scenario in which she retains her belief, it seems pretty 
reasonable that she keeps her knowledge (the metaphilosophical skeptic can admit all of 
this). But it doesn’t do anything to suggest that Ev-of-Ev is wrong. 
 Here is an objection to Ev-of-Ev.
 We defer to  scientifi c experts and liveness; and we ought to. There seems to be a pretty tight con-
nection between being scientifi cally live and being probably-roughly-true: if a hypothesis has the 
former quality, then there is good reason to think it has the latter quality. Crudely put, we are all 
aware that science is reliable. That is why a scientifi cally live hypothesis that confl icts with your 
belief poses a formidable epistemic threat to your belief, a threat that must be defused in order for 
the belief to be knowledge (at least provided you’re aware of the threat). But no such connection 
holds between the characteristic of being philosophically live and being probably-roughly-true. 
Crudely put, we all know that philosophy is unreliable. So expert endorsement fails to mean 
signifi cant evidence. A philosophically live hypothesis doesn’t threaten our contrary beliefs. 
 The target of this objection  seems to be Ev-of-Ev, the principle that mere mortals have 
strong evidence of strong evidence for H.  Alternatively, perhaps the objector is agreeing 
that such evidence E 
1
 exists but is saying that by going through the above reasoning the 
mere mortal gets an epistemic item suffi  cient for overwhelming E 
1
 ; that would mean 
the objection really targets 2→~D. In any case, I think the objection fails. 
 The supporter of this objection needs to explain why the fact that we often defer to 
scientists but not philosophers is epistemically signifi cant. Clearly, if we did so merely 
because philosophers smell worse than scientists this would not mean that philosophical 
liveness was less epistemically potent than scientifi c liveness. So the strength of the 
objection lies in the plausibility of its explanation for the diff erence in deferment prac-
tice: the objector has to explain why we  justifi ably fail to defer to philosophers. 
 The objection makes an attempt: we defer to one but not the other because we are 
aware that the connection between being scientifi cally live and being probably-
roughly-true is much tighter than the connection between being philosophically live 
and being probably-roughly-true. But I think that anyone who has actually done 
some science knows that that explanation is empirically false. Scientists put forth false 
views all the time, and in large quantities. Philosophers and laypeople end up hearing 
about just the supremely best ones, but the oodles of run-of-the-mill false ones are 
there too. Nevertheless, the objection is worth taking seriously because we are aware 
that the  primary scientifi c theories, the ones that have been around a long time and are 
pivotal for research, are epistemically much better than the analogous philosophical 
theories. 
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 That sounds reasonable: we are aware that long-term vigorous endorsement of a sci-
entifi c theory by scientists who are experts in the relevant area provides much more 
reason to believe that theory than long-term vigorous endorsement of a purely philo-
sophical theory by philosophers who are “experts” in the relevant areas. But this argu-
ment has a gap in the crucial spot. It doesn’t matter whether we know that the  signifi cant 
scientifi c endorsement → probably roughly true connection is stronger than the  signifi cant philo-
sophical endorsement → probably roughly true connection. The metaphilosophical skeptic can 
agree with that comparative claim. Her point, which is obviously true, is that the com-
parative claim is moot. The only thing that matters is this: does long-term vigorous 
endorsement of a purely philosophical theory by the top philosophers in the relevant 
areas provide  enough reason to sabotage my retention of my amateur belief that those 
theories are false and the relevant part of common sense is true—even if it isn’t as epis-
temically powerful as the analogous scientifi c endorsement? Just because science beats 
the hell out of philosophy in this one respect gives us no reason at all to think that philo-
sophical liveness is not epistemically signifi cant enough for the truth of metaphilosoph-
ical skepticism. That’s the gap in the objection. 
 What if a philosopher comes to reasonably believe that not only is the  signifi cant philo-
sophical endorsement → probably roughly true connection much weaker than the analogous 
science connection (a belief that the metaphilosophical skeptic may agree with) but is so 
weak that E 
1
 does not, in fact, supply her with strong evidence that there is strong evi-
dence against P—despite the fact that the above objection supplies no reason for think-
ing this? This would mean, of course, that she thinks Ev-of-Ev is false. But so what? The 
skeptic relies on just the truth of that principle; the renegade doesn’t have to believe it in 
order for it to do its work in the skeptic’s argument. 
 But suppose I’m wrong and Ev-of-Ev is false for philosophy.  As with the last objec-
tion to premise (a), the cure is epistemically worse than the disease. If Ev-of-Ev is false 
for philosophy, then we have scenarios such as this: when you learn that 44 per cent of 
philosophers of logic and language say H with respect to theories of truth, you have 
not acquired strong evidence that they have strong evidence for H. Why might that be? 
The only answer I can think of: it’s because those philosophers don’t have any strong 
evidence for H, even though they’ve been evaluating H for many years and they started 
out not only with no emotional attachment to H (H isn’t anything like “God exists”) 
but a strong disposition to  reject H (recall that H is an anti-commonsensical claim). If all 
that is true, then it says something epistemically horrible about philosophy. 
 8 Comments on premise (e) 
 I have already tried to motivate premise (e), the Ev&~Sk→D principle, in section 3. This 
principle says that if one of the philosophers mentioned in (a) has strong evidence E 
1
 
that there is evidence E 
2
 that she doesn’t have or has underappreciated (and so on), then 
if in spite of having E 
1
 her retaining her belief P suff ers no serious epistemic defect, then 
she must have some epistemic item that overwhelms E 
1
 . The skeptic is not putting 
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any untoward limits on the items that can do the work in overwhelming E 
1
 . Perhaps all 
that is needed is a huge amount of warrant for P obtained in the utterly ordinary way 
(e.g. seeing a baseball in the trunk of one’s car, for the compositional nihilism case), so 
nothing like an  argument against H or E 
2
 is required. Further, the item need not “coun-
ter” E 
2
 at all. For instance, a person who is mathematically weak will still know that 1 ≠ 2 
even if she can’t fi nd any error in a “proof” that 1 = 2 (the “proofs” in question usually 
illicitly divide by zero at some point). She has no direct counter to the derivation; all she 
has is a phenomenal amount of warrant for her commonsensical belief that 1 ≠ 2. Per-
haps something similar holds in the philosophical cases we are examining, at least for the 
error theory cases. I will consider that possibility in section 11. All the Ev&~Sk→D prin-
ciple is saying is that philosophers need  some item that can do the trick; she is not 
demanding that the item counter E 
2
 or H at all—even if she would be right to make 
such a demand. 
 I will consider just one objection to Ev&~Sk→D.
 (i) In truth, there is no evidence for the purely philosophical error theories, and (ii) because of 
that fact their sociological liveness does not threaten our beliefs (thereby lowering their warrant 
levels enough so that they don’t amount to knowledge). The arguments supporting those theories 
are not obviously mistaken in any way, which is why excellent philosophers continue to endorse 
them, but that hardly means that those arguments supply honest-to-goodness evidence for their 
conclusions. For instance, if all the experts who endorse hypothesis H and reject common belief 
P are using fatally fl awed methods in gathering evidence for H and against P, then such methods 
are not generating evidence for H or against P, since “evidence” is a kind of success term that rules 
out this kind of pseudo-support. This observation is especially warranted for pure philosophy 
since there is serious reason to think that large parts of purely philosophical argument (e.g. 
 synthetic a priori reasoning) are irredeemably fl awed. In other words, in order to escape 
 metaphilosophical skepticism it is not necessary to have any interesting or impressive epistemic 
item when E 
2
 doesn’t actually exist; and for the error theories E 
2
 does not in fact exist. 
 I doubt whether claim (i) is true, for reasons I’ll get to in section 11, but I won’t evaluate 
it here, as the objection fails on claim (ii), whether or not claim (i) is true. An example 
will prove this. Pretend that all the science behind radiometric dating (the main method 
for fi guring out that many things on earth are many millions of years old) is fatally 
fl awed in some horrendous manner, so those methods don’t generate (real) evidence (in 
the “success” sense of “evidence”). Even so, since I have become aware of the fact that 
the scientifi c community is virtually unanimous in the view that radiometric dating is 
accurate and shows that the Earth is hundreds of millions if not several billion years old, 
my creationist belief that the Earth is just a few thousand years old doesn’t amount to 
knowledge, even if it’s true and did amount to knowledge before I heard about radio-
metric dating and scientifi c opinion. Awareness of signifi cant expertly endorsed 
“pseudo-evidence,” if you want to call it that, is suffi  cient to sabotage belief retention 
in many cases. 
 Further, the metaphilosophical skeptic need not hold that the evidence for purely 
philosophical error theories is often or at least some times good enough to warrant  belief 
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in the truth of those theories. On the contrary, she might insist that the evidence for 
error theories is almost never  that good, so the philosophers who actually believe these 
theories are doing so unjustifi ably. 
 9 Comments on premise (g) 
 I don’t see much basis for quarreling with premise (g), which is the claim that Condition 
2 applies to many typical philosophers with respect to philosophical claims they dis-
agree with. Premise (g) says that the specialists who accept H and reject P (as well as the 
experts who are agnostic on both H and P) are aware of and unimpressed by S’s evi-
dence and other epistemically relevant items that do or might support P or cast doubt 
on H or E 
2
 . With regard to the error theories, in particular, it is implausible to think that 
I the amateur have some special piece of evidence or whatnot that the epistemicists or 
compositional nihilists or moral error theorists have overlooked, as I don’t do expert 
work in any of those areas. Perhaps the error theorists have seriously underestimated the 
epistemic warrant supplied by, for instance, the alethic reliability of the belief-producing 
cognitive processes that led to my belief in P, but that is another matter—a potentially 
important one I’ll deal with in section 11. Of course, I might be one of the lucky ones 
who have reasons that not only cast doubt on H, ~P, and/or E 
2
 but that would be judged 
by the advocates and agnostics on H to be new and impressive; premise (g) allows for the 
existence of such people. The metaphilosophical skeptic’s point with (g) is that these 
people are uncommon. 
 10 Initial comments on premise (h) 
 This premise, principle 2→~D, says that if a philosopher in (a) also satisfi es Condition 2, 
then it’s highly likely that she fails to have any epistemic item that overwhelms E 
1
 . Here 
is one objection to this premise:
 When I look at the diversity of opinion of my epistemic superiors regarding H and P, and I see 
that they are utterly divided on whether H is true despite the fact that they are in constant and 
rich communication with one another concerning the considerations for and against H, that 
tells me that those considerations are just plain inconclusive. Let’s face it: despite their great 
intelligence and best eff orts they are confused by the arguments they are working on. In some 
real sense the specialists’ opinions  cancel out when they are divided, as is the case when, say, 40 per 
cent accept H, 30 per cent reject H, and 30 per cent withhold judgment. And once their views 
cancel out, we are left where we started, with our initial belief P unthreatened. 
 The idea here is that the renegade could go through this reasoning and thereby acquire 
an epistemic item suffi  cient for overwhelming E 
1
 . 
 The fi rst problem here is that none of this singles out pure philosophy over pure 
 science; the second problem is that it’s pretty clearly false in the scientifi c case (which 
 suggests it won’t be true in the philosophy case). Just think of the Jupiter case again: if 
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40 per cent of the astronomers accept the “over 200 moons” theory, 30 per cent reject it, 
and 30 per cent withhold judgment, this shows that the issue is unresolved in the public 
square, which is exactly where the mere mortal lies. She would be a fool to think her 
childhood belief regarding the number of moons was correct. 
 Here is another objection to 2→~D:
 Some philosophers have given very general arguments that suggest that virtually all purely 
philosophical error theories have to be false or at least not worthy of serious consideration 
due to radically insuffi  cient overall evidence (e.g. Mark Johnston 1992a, 1992b, 1993; Paul 
 Horwich  1998 ; Frank  Jackson  1998 ; Crispin  Wright  1994 ; Thomas  Kelly  2008 ; for rebuttals 
to these arguments see Alex  Miller  2002 and Chris Daly and David Liggins 2010). Those 
philosophical  arguments supply me with good evidence E 
3
 that the evidence E 
1
 (based on 
expert  endorsement) for the evidence E 
2
 (based on philosophical arguments) for the error 
theory is misleading. That is, the anti-error theory arguments show that even though E 
1
 exists 
and is good evidence for the existence and strength of evidence for an error theory, the 
 evidence E 
3
  presented by the anti-error theory philosophers cancels out E 
1
 . So, most  renegades 
are exceptions to 2→~D. 
 Let us assume on behalf of the objector that philosopher Fred  knows the soundness of 
some general line of reasoning that really does show that E 
1
 is misleading evidence for 
E 
2
 , since the line of reasoning Fred knows about shows that E 
2
 is actually quite weak.  So 
we are assuming that there really is a general line of argument that successfully proves that all these 
error theories are virtually without any support . Hence, Fred is one of the exceptions to 
2→~D. Unfortunately, all this will demonstrate is how lucky Fred is, since the great 
majority of philosophers are not so epistemically fortunate, regardless of whether such 
arguments are possible or actual or even actually known to be sound by a few fortunate 
individuals such as Fred. Matters would be diff erent if it were very widely known that 
such anti-error theories are correct, but it goes without saying that this isn’t the case 
now; nor was it the case in the past (and there is no reason I know of to think it will 
become widely known in the near future). The metaphilosophical skeptic can consist-
ently combine her skepticism with the assertion that she, like Fred,  knows perfectly well 
that all error theories are false and have no signifi cant supporting evidence (in the “suc-
cess” sense of “evidence”). 
 There is another way to construe the objection. Perhaps the idea is that if a philoso-
pher sincerely  thinks she has an excellent argument against all (or a good portion) of the 
error theories, then that’s enough to render her belief retention reasonable. Even if she’s 
wrong about having such an argument, if she merely thinks she has one, then she can 
hardly be blamed for sticking with her commonsensical belief. Her conviction that she 
has the magic argument against error theories is enough to win the reasonableness of 
her retaining her commonsensical belief; the conviction suffi  ces as the required epis-
temic item. 
 There’s some truth to that line of reasoning. If one really is so clueless that one thinks 
one has, as an amateur with respect to the operative subfi elds, an argument of staggering 
philosophical consequence—which is obviously what her argument would have to 
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be—then there is something epistemically appropriate in her sticking with her belief. 
The skeptic should allow this: the belief retention is epistemically fl awless. But then she 
fi nds epistemic fault somewhere else: the commonsensical philosopher’s belief that she 
has the magic pro-commonsense argument that “should” be rocking the philosophical 
community. Only the desperately naïve, arrogant, or otherwise epistemically fl awed 
professional philosopher could have such a belief. So, although she may escape the 
metaphilosophical skeptical snare, she is merely trading one epistemic sin for another. 
 In spite of my rejection of those two objections to 2→~D, in my judgment this premise 
is the one that is most likely to be false for the cases we’re interested in. The  obvious can-
didates for epistemic items that are up to the job are, I think, already listed in Condition 
2; so they won’t help us avoid the skeptical snare. The whole interest in this premise lies 
in the possible non-obvious exceptions: do typical philosophers who satisfy Condition 
1 and Condition 2 usually have epistemic items strong enough that they suff er no epis-
temic defect in retaining their commonsensical beliefs? 
 11 The Overwhelming Warrant objection to premise (h) 
 The one objection to metaphilosophical skepticism that I think has a prayer of working 
off ers an affi  rmative answer to the question just posed: a considerable percentage of rene-
gades have epistemic items that are suffi  cient for “overwhelming” E 
1
 . Here is the objection:
 Let us admit that when a large number and percentage of recognized “experts” in philosophy 
believe an error theory based on epistemically responsible investigations over many years and 
what they consider to be multiple lines of signifi cant yet purely philosophical support, we are 
faced with impressive sociological evidence E 
1
 that those theories have impressive philosophical 
evidence E 
2
 in their favor—where E 
2
 is impressive enough to actually convince all those legiti-
mate experts that the error theory is really literally true. After all, it’s not plausible that the epis-
temic weight of their considered opinion all of a sudden vanishes as soon as they move from 
scientifi cally relevant considerations to purely philosophical ones. 
 Despite all that, our commonsensical beliefs have  huge amounts of warrant backing them up 
and that’s an epistemic item that suffi  ces for the consequent of Ev&~Sk→D. Perhaps reliability 
comes in here: commonsensical beliefs such as “I have a laptop” and “Dogs are dogs” are formed 
via extremely reliable and otherwise epistemically upstanding processes, and so the resulting 
beliefs have a great deal of warrant—even if we aren’t aware of its strength. In any case, it takes 
a correspondingly very powerful body of evidence to render those beliefs unjustifi ed overall, and 
although we have good reason to think the purely philosophical arguments E 
2
 for error theories 
are good, they are not  that good. Science might be up to the task (as science rejected the “Earth 
doesn’t move” bit of common sense) but not pure philosophy. 
 It’s worth noting right away that this objection has no applicability outside of error 
theories. It would be over the top to think that one’s belief P had overwhelming war-
rant when it comes to content externalism, four-dimensionalism, the Millian view of 
proper names, or hundreds of other philosophical theses. Thus, this objection will not 
justify the renegade in any of those cases. 
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 There are a couple ways to fi ll out the objection. It defi nitely makes this comparative 
claim W, which I will focus on below: the warrant that renegades have for P overwhelms 
the warrant supplied by E 
2
 against P (when it comes to philosophical error theories). At 
this point the objection can proceed in either of two ways. It can say that the mere  truth 
of W gives the renegade an epistemic item strong enough that her belief retention is not 
epistemically defective—so the renegade doesn’t also need to be  aware that W is true. 
Alternatively, it can say that the renegade is off  the hook only if she is aware that W is 
true: only with that awareness does she actually  possess an epistemic item suffi  cient to 
secure her belief retention. Here is a Moorean speech that would express the renegade’s 
endorsement of W:
 I am epistemically justifi ed in thinking that any argument that says there are no cars, for 
instance, has just got to have a premise that is less justifi ed than the claim that there are cars—
even if I can’t put my fi nger on which premise in the anti-commonsensical argument is guilty. 
I am justifi ed in gazing at error theories and just saying “That can’t be right.” Notice that I am 
engaging in a reliable belief retention scenario: although E 
1
 is indeed strong evidence that there 
is strong evidence E 
2
 for H and against P, E 
2
 is not strong evidence for H when two conditions 
hold: E 
2
 comes exclusively from philosophy and P is a bit of universal common sense. Philoso-
phy has a lousy record of refuting common sense! I grant you that the specialists who consider 
error theories to have a good chance at being true know a lot more than I do regarding the 
relevant philosophical matters, but they’re not my superiors when it comes to that simple judg-
ment about philosophy. Further, since this Moorean response is so well known, a great many 
of us renegades have a good reason to think that the evidence E 
2
 for error theories stinks. So, 
we renegades have an epistemic item good enough to defang the skeptic; we fall into the class 
of exceptions to 2→~D. 
 Although there are several problems with the Overwhelming Warrant objection, I will 
look just at claim W, off ering fi ve criticisms of it. 
 First criticism. Much of the warrant for the commonsensical P is also warrant for the 
anti-commonsensical H. For instance, much of the warrant for “Here is a tree” is also 
warrant for “Here are some particles arranged tree-wise” (which is the corresponding 
sentence compositional nihilism off ers). In fact, it’s often remarked that perception 
off ers no warrant for the former that it does the latter. This holds for many philosophical 
error theories.  And if that’s right, then it’s hard to see how the  comparative warrant claim 
W can be true. 
 Second criticism. We are familiar with the fact that science, including mathematics, 
often overthrows bits of common sense. Philosophers often respond with “Yes, but that’s 
science; philosophy’s diff erent.” I looked at that objection in section 7. But the lesson I 
want to press here can just grant that philosophy will never, ever overthrow common 
sense. My objection starts with the obvious observation:  we are already used to common 
sense being proven wrong or highly doubtful . It has already failed; the fl aws are plain to see to 
anyone with some knowledge of history. So why on earth should we keep on thinking 
it’s so epistemically powerful given that we have already proven that it’s false or at least 
highly contentious in many stunning cases? Sure, you can fi nd many commonsensical 
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beliefs that have escaped scientifi c refutation  thus far, but so what? What makes you think 
that with regard to your favorite bits of common sense  this time common sense has got 
things right ? Pretend that commonsensical beliefs are all listed in one giant book (more 
plausibly, the book consists of just a great many paradigmatic commonsensical beliefs 
that are representative of the others). The book was around two thousand years ago. 
Over the centuries many of the beliefs have been refuted by science: pages and pages 
have been crossed off . So why should we think the remainder—the ones that have not 
 yet been refuted by science—are so epistemically secure? The remainder at the start of 
the twentieth century wasn’t secure; why think the remainder at the start of the twenty-
fi rst century is secure? On the contrary, we know that the book is unreliable, and the 
mere fact that some beliefs are not yet crossed off  gives no reason to think they never 
will be. 
 This is not to say that we should  withhold judgment on every commonsensical claim 
not yet refuted. This isn’t the Cartesian reaction to surprising science. Instead, it’s the 
much more plausible idea that we should no longer think that the warrant for the 
remaining commonsensical beliefs is enormous. 
 Thus, I fi nd it hard to swallow the idea that today’s common sense that has yet to be 
refuted by science has some enormous body of warrant backing it up.  And that makes 
me wary of the comparative warrant claim W that the warrant that renegades have for P 
overwhelms the warrant supplied by E 
2
 against P: it’s not clear that the fi rst bit of war-
rant is being correctly estimated. 
 Third criticism. In my judgment the arguments in favor of at least some error theories 
are especially strong, which again puts serious doubt on W. The complete and utter fail-
ure to defuse certain anti-commonsensical philosophical arguments suggests that the 
philosophical reasoning in those arguments, E 
2
 , is not weak—on the contrary it’s very 
strong. For instance, some philosophers have noted that the basic argument for epis-
temicism (or at least sharp cutoff s in truth conditions) has just about the best chance to 
be  the strongest argument in the history of philosophy , notwithstanding the fact that few phil-
osophers can bring themselves to accept it—although it’s certainly telling that the per-
centage of accepting philosophers increases enormously the more familiar one is with 
the relevant issues. Often the paradox is introduced via a simple argument form such as 
this:
 1. A person with $0 isn’t rich. 
 2. If a person with $n isn’t rich, then a person with $(n + 1) isn’t rich, for any whole 
number n. 
 3. Thus, no one is rich. 
 It’s easy to see how (1)–(3) make up a serious philosophical problem: just consider the 
following fi ve individually plausible yet apparently collectively inconsistent claims.
 • Claim (1) is true. 
 • Claim (3) is false. 
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 • The argument is logically valid. 
 • If claim (2) were false, then there would have to be a whole number n such that 
a person with $n isn’t rich but a person with just one more dollar is rich. 
 • But such sharp cutoff s don’t exist for predicates like “person x is rich.” 
 Even the most elementary logic says that you have to give up at least one of those bullet 
points, and yet no matter which bullet point you give up, you end up with an error 
 theory! 14 That’s a very strong  meta-argument for the truth of at least one error theory , although 
it doesn’t say which error theory will be the true one. I have been assuming in this essay 
that all the error theories are false (in order to give the renegade her best shot at epis-
temic salvation), but I must confess that I don’t see how that assumption could come out 
true. I won’t argue the matter here, but I think the same lesson—we simply must adopt 
an error theory, no matter what logical option we choose in resolving the paradox—
holds for the group of semantic paradoxes, as well as the group of material composition 
paradoxes. So for at least some of the cases we’re interested in, E 
2
 is indeed strong 
 evidence against P even if the H in question is really a small disjunction of error theories 
(P will have to be a small disjunction as well). 
 Of course, one may always hold out for a commonsensical solution to the paradoxes. 
One can insist that there simply must be  some approach consistent with common sense 
that no one has thought of, despite the fact that the large group of geniuses who have 
been working on the paradoxes for centuries have failed to fi nd one. This sounds like a 
desperate, baseless hope to me. 
 I know the following remark won’t make me any friends, but I think that in many 
cases a Moorean response to the philosophical error theories is endorsed only by those 
people ignorant of the extreme diffi  culties that error theorists in the philosophy of lan-
guage, philosophy of logic, philosophy of physics, metaethics, and metaphysics are deal-
ing with. The Moorean response assumes that we are justifi ed in thinking that some 
premise in the error theorist’s argument is far less supported than the corresponding 
commonsensical claim (which is obviously inconsistent with the error theory). But of 
course that’s precisely what’s at issue: the error theorist says that the overall evidence is in 
favor of her premises and not in favor of the commonsensical proposition whose nega-
tion is entailed by those premises. More importantly, the philosopher who thinks  some 
error theory has got to be true—although she is agnostic on which one is true—has an 
even better argument than the individual error theorists. For what it’s worth, I was once 
a Moorean, and I agree that Mooreanism is the most rational way to  start doing philoso-
phy. In particular, when one fi rst hears about a philosopher who says “There are no 
trees” one should, rationally, adopt the Moorean approach. But as soon as one educates 
oneself about (a) the sanity, level-headedness, and intelligence of people who say these 
weird things; (b) the incredibly long history of the failure to fi nd commonsensical 
 14 In fact, if it turns out that the fi ve bullet points are not collectively inconsistent, contrary to appearances, 
that still gives us an error theory.  
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 solutions to the paradoxes; (c) the meta-arguments for anti-commonsensical theories; 
and (d) the history of common sense being refuted by science, then one has to sober up. 
We don’t employ the Moorean move when faced with teams of physicists or biologists 
who claim to have upended some bits of common sense; we act that way because of the 
experimental data and inventions those investigators generate (roughly put). The philo-
sophical error theorists generate neither. Instead, they have (a)–(d). After I took a close 
look at the philosophical paradoxes and refl ected on how science has already shown that 
common sense is not as impressive as it’s cracked up to be, I dropped my Mooreanism. 15 
 Fourth criticism. Consider a purely scientifi c case: that of astronomers saying that 
common sense is wrong about the Sun going around the Earth. They have a  strong expla-
nation of why every single day it sure looks as though the Earth is still and the Sun is 
going around it, even though that’s all false. But the purely philosophical error theorists 
also have these explanations, which suggests that they are successfully following the sci-
entifi c way of combating common sense. I know of no argument at all that suggests that 
there is anything awful with the compositional nihilist’s explanation that we perceive 
things as composite just because the simples are arranged in certain tight and stable ways. 
On the contrary, usually it’s simply granted as perfectly obvious that no possible experi-
ment could tell the diff erence between a world with composite trees and a world with 
just tree-arranged simples! As noted above, it is commonly thought that perception, for 
instance, off ers no support for common sense over nihilism. The fact that “There are 
trees” is part of common sense comes from the fact that we have certain perceptions; 
that’s the evidential basis. But we would get the very same perceptions if the error the-
ory were true. And if there were something awful with the compositional nihilist’s 
explanation, then why on earth would those people embrace it after so much long-term 
sophisticated refl ection by our best and brightest who are trying to retain common 
sense? 
 My fi fth reason for not accepting the Overwhelming Warrant objection has to do 
with the source of discomfort philosophers have with error theories: I think that in 
some cases it’s the result of a misunderstanding, and this causes them to underestimate 
the warrant for error theories (which in turn leads them to endorse W). Let me 
explain. 
 I think there might be a specifi c disposition at work in  some philosophers who insist 
that error theories don’t have much backing warrant, a disposition that accounts for a 
good deal (but certainly not all) of their hard resistance to such theories despite the fact 
that the arguments supporting them—including the error explanations mentioned in 
the previous paragraphs—are quite reasonable and evidentially supported. 
 15  Kelly ( 2008 ) attempts to show that the philosophical “moderate,” who rejects error theories but also 
thinks there is something procedurely wrong with Moorean moves, lands in all sorts of trouble. He casts the 
debate as involving the error theorist, the Moorean, and the Moderate. But he fails to consider a fourth 
participant: the philosopher who rejects the Moorean move but is agnostic regarding the error theories, 
neither accepting nor rejecting them. This character escapes the woes of moderation.  
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 When a theory says that your belief that fi re engines are red is incorrect, you should 
initially be stunned. The right fi rst reaction should be something like “Well, are they 
dark orange or purple or what?” Same for other theories: when a theory says that 2 10 ≠ 
1024, or that what Hitler did wasn’t morally wrong, or that Moore didn’t believe that we 
have knowledge, or that there are no baseballs, one is disposed to look for explanations 
such as “2 10 = 10 4 4, not 10 2 4,” “Hitler was morally okay because he actually had good 
intentions,” “Moore was lying in all those articles and lectures,” and “The whole edifi ce 
of baseball has been an elaborate joke erected just to fool you!” And we can’t take those 
explanations seriously for two reasons: there is no evidence for them, and there is no 
evidence that we made such ridiculous mistakes. 
 But the error theorist isn’t accusing us of any mistake like those. Indeed, although she 
is alleging false beliefs it seems strained to call them  mistakes at all. Believing that fi re 
engines are red when in fact they’re orange is a mistake; believing they are red when no 
ordinary physical object in the universe is red or any other color but appears colored in 
all perfectly good viewing conditions is something else entirely, even though it’s still a 
false belief. When one has a visceral reaction to error theories (you’ve probably wit-
nessed them: rolling of the eyes, knowing smiles, winks, “that’s preposterous,” “that just 
can’t be right,” “get serious,” and so on), often enough it’s not reason that is doing the 
talking. Instead, and here is my attempt at armchair psychology, what is at work here is 
the disposition to treat philosophical false beliefs as something akin to mistakes, in the 
ordinary sense of “mistake.” And that’s a mistake. When a nut says that twice two isn’t 
four but seven, she’s saying that we’ve all made an arithmetic error; when a philosopher 
says that twice two isn’t four  or any other number , she isn’t accusing us of any arithmetic 
error.  And she isn’t accusing us of some philosophical error, some error in philosophical 
reasoning. Instead, she’s saying that there is a naturally occurring error in a fundamental 
part of our conceptual scheme that oddly enough has no untoward consequences in any 
practical or even scientifi c realm. And that’s  why the error survives to infect our com-
monsensical beliefs. The presence of such an error is by no means outrageous; for 
instance, surely there’s little reason why evolutionary forces would prevent such errors. 
The “mistake” the error theorist is accusing us of is akin to (but of course diff erent from) 
the error a child makes when counting fi sh in a picture that has whales and dolphins in 
it: it’s a “mere technicality” that happens to be philosophically interesting (depending on 
one’s philosophical tastes of course). The error theorist is saying that like the child we 
have made no gaff e, or blunder, or slip-up, or oversight. If you throw a chair at a com-
position nihilist, she ducks anyway. 
 None of this is meant to convince you that the error theories are  true ; throughout this 
essay I have assumed that they are all false. Instead, I’m trying to block the objection to 
metaphilosophical skepticism that runs “philosophical error theories shouldn’t be taken 
to have a serious amount of warrant because they have lousy explanations for our false 
beliefs.” Due to the peculiar nature of the errors being attributed, I think the error theo-
ries are not profi tably thought of as radically against common sense (although I stick 
with the vulgar and call them “radical” from time to time). To say that twice two is seven 
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and fi re engines are purple is to express a view radically at odds with common sense; to 
say that twice two isn’t anything and fi re engines have no color at all is not to express a 
view radically at odds with common sense (although of course it does go against com-
mon sense). 
 It’s also worth noting that in the usual case the philosophical error theorist comes to 
her anti-commonsensical view  kicking and screaming , which again suggests that when they 
endorse an error theory they are doing so on the basis of impressive warrant (and not, for 
instance, some weakness for anti-commonsensical theories), which again suggests that 
W is false. Many philosophers consider certain religious views (e.g. there is something 
morally wrong about non-heterosexual sex, the bread becomes the body of Christ) to be 
comparably odd and hold that extremely intelligent people have these views only because 
they have been indoctrinated, usually as children. Needless to say, this isn’t the case for 
philosophical error theories. For instance, Williamson began the project that led to his 
epistemicism with the explicit goal of  refuting epistemicism ( Williamson  1994 : xi)! I 
myself initially found epistemicism, color-error theory, compositional nihilism, and tradi-
tional skepticism highly dubious, but after soberly looking at the relevant arguments over 
several years I became somewhat favorably disposed to all those theories even if I never 
quite accepted any of them. In addition, I don’t see how anyone can not take error theo-
ries seriously if they are actually aware of the array of problems that any theory of material 
composition would have to solve in order to be comprehensive (e.g. Statue-Clay, Tibbles-
Tib, Ship of Theseus, vagueness, problem of the many, and so on). Or just look at the vari-
ous logical options for dealing with the sorites or semantic paradoxes. The point is this: 
these error theorists became convinced of the error theories based on the argu mentative 
evidence, since quite often they were initially strongly inclined to  disbelieve them. So it’s 
over the top to suggest that most philosophers who take error theories seri ously do so 
based only on some weakness for weird ideas, as opposed to strength of evidence. 16 
 12 The nature of the epistemic defect 
 I don’t see any good way to defeat the metaphilosophical skeptic’s argument applied to 
“ordinary” philosophical disputes (i.e. those not involving error theories). For example, 
 16 This also casts doubt on the idea that some pernicious  selection eff ect skews the percentages of philoso-
phers who are in favor of or at least hospitable to (i.e. not dismissive of  ) error theories in the philosophy of 
language, philosophy of logic, metaethics, philosophy of physics, and metaphysics. One might initially 
 wonder whether it’s virtually an entrance requirement into the club of philosophers who publish on certain 
topics that one is strongly disposed to favor error theories. If so, then just because a large number and 
 percentage of philosophers endorse error theories might not indicate signifi cant evidence in favor of those 
theories. (The reverse holds as well: for some clubs one must toe the commonsense line.) I don’t deny that 
there are selection eff ects, but a blameworthy weakness for error theories strikes me as implausible ( especially 
over the last few decades compared to other periods in the history of philosophy, as today’s philosophers 
have tended to put a higher than usual epistemic weight on common sense). If anything, a strong aversion 
to error theories causes philosophers to avoid areas in which they are rife, thereby causing pernicious 
 selection eff ects in other areas.  
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if you are a content internalist but not a philosopher of mind and you satisfy Condition 
1 and Condition 2, then retaining your internalist belief after fi nding out about the large 
number and percentage of disagreeing philosophers of mind means that you suff er a 
serious epistemic defect. 17 But what is this defect? 
 The obvious answer: the belief retention is defective in the sense that the retained 
belief does not amount to knowledge, it’s not justifi ed, and the believer is blameworthy 
for retaining it. So the  action of belief retention is defective because the  retained belief is 
defective in familiar ways. However, I think matters might not be so simple here. I agree 
that in the ordinary, non-error theory cases the renegade’s belief isn’t justifi ed or war-
ranted and doesn’t amount to knowledge. I’m less sure about the blameworthiness point. 
For one thing, philosophy is a very individualistic enterprise. Appeals to authority, for 
instance, are viewed as virtually worthless. Given all that, perhaps the blame that applies 
to the renegade with respect to non-error theories is relatively mild. So, I would recom-
mend that the metaphilosophical skeptic adopt the modest view that the epistemic 
defect in ordinary philosophical cases includes lack of knowledge and justifi cation along 
with at least a  mild kind of blameworthiness. 
 The obvious view regarding the epistemic defect in the error theory cases is that it’s 
the same as in the non-error theory cases: the renegade’s belief retention is defective in 
the sense that her retained belief won’t be justifi ed or amount to knowledge, even if it 
was justifi ed and amounted to knowledge before she found out about her disagreeing 
epistemic superiors. However, a wise skeptic who thinks her thesis is true pretty much 
no matter what the correct theory of central epistemological notions turns out to be 
will want to allow the epistemic possibility that in the actual world (if not all possible 
worlds) propositional knowledge is not only cheap and easy but very hard to knock 
down once established (so once you know something, it is very diffi  cult to encounter 
counterevidence powerful enough to ruin that knowledge). Perhaps the “bar” or thresh-
old for justifi cation and warrant is much, much lower than philosophers have thought 
over the centuries (even now, with race-to-the-bottom reliabilism so popular!). If that’s 
right, then the renegade’s retained belief in P might amount to knowledge even if it suf-
fers from a serious epistemic defect: upon learning about her disagreeing superiors her 
belief ’s overall warrant decreases considerably—that’s the defect the skeptic is insisting 
on—but remains high enough to meet the very low threshold for warrant and justifi ca-
tion. The belief still amounts to knowledge but this is  impoverished knowledge compared 
to its status before learning about the disagreeing superiors. 
 However, although I think this is a theory of the epistemic defect that the skeptic 
should allow for (as a plausible option), even this theory might not be optimal because it 
is hostage to the results of the relations among epistemic qualities.  As bizarre as it might 
sound, I think the skeptic should admit that even if her skeptical thesis is true in the error 
 17 The only way I see around this is the idea that the renegade’s belief is merely of the inclination-fi rst-
order kind I mentioned at the end of section 3.  
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theory cases, if the renegade’s circumstances and the true epistemological theories are 
peculiar enough (as discussed below) then all the following might be true as well:
 1. The renegade’s belief P starts out justifi ed, warranted, and amounting to 
knowledge. 
 2. Upon learning of his epistemic superiors his belief retains those statuses. 
 3. Upon learning of his epistemic superiors the warrant that his belief has doesn’t 
change. Thus, the discovery of signifi cant contrary epistemic superior opinion 
does not diminish the warrant had by the renegade’s belief. 
 4. Upon learning of his epistemic superiors he doesn’t acquire any evidence against 
his belief. 
 5. He is blameless in retaining his belief. 
 When I say that the metaphilosophical skeptic should “keep open the possibility” that 
(1)–(5) are true even though her skeptical thesis is true as well (again, applied only to 
purely philosophical error theories), I don’t mean to imply that the skeptic should hold 
that her thesis is metaphysically consistent with the conjunction of (1)–(5). All I mean is 
that she should say something like “For all I can be certain about, (1)–(5) might be true 
along with my skepticism.” 
 I now have two tasks in the rest of this section: explain why the metaphilosophical 
skeptic should admit that despite the truth of her position, (1)–(5) might be actually true 
as well; and explain what “seriously epistemically defi cient” means in light of that 
explanation. 
 Before I carry out those two tasks, I need to make sure we agree that the epistemic status 
of the  belief retention can be quite diff erent from the epistemic status of the  retained belief . For 
instance, if my belief starts out unjustifi ed and I encounter a small amount of evidence for 
it (e.g. a recognized epistemic peer agrees with me, as she has made the same faulty assess-
ment of the evidence), the reasonable thing for me to do  in response to the peer is keep the 
belief: the belief retention is reasonable but the retained belief is not. It is harder to see how 
the situation could arise in which the belief starts out justifi ed, the belief retention is 
unreasonable, and the retained belief is justifi ed. However, I am in the process of giving 
reasons for the idea that the skeptic should be willing to say that that may be the situation 
when it comes to commonsensical beliefs and purely philosophical error theories. 18 
 Suppose Mo thinks he might have disease X. He goes to his doctor who administers a 
test meant to determine whether or not Mo has X. The doctor tells Mo, correctly, that 
the test has two excellent features: if someone has X and takes the test, the test will cor-
rectly say “You have X” a whopping 99.9 per cent of the time and it will incorrectly say 
“You don’t have X” a measly 0.1 per cent of the time; and if someone doesn’t have X 
and takes the test, the test will correctly say “You don’t have X” 99.9 per cent of the time 
 18 It’s somewhat easier to see how a belief could start out unjustifi ed, the belief retention is unreasonable, 
and the retained belief is justifi ed: the initial unjustifi ed element is cancelled out by the second unreasonable 
element.  
philosophical renegades 157
and it will incorrectly say “You have X” 0.1 per cent of the time. Mo is impressed with 
these facts and comes to have belief B: if the test says you have X, then there’s an excel-
lent chance you have X. I take it that this is a reasonable belief for Mo to have; his belief 
is also blameless. (If that’s not clear, assume that almost all diseases that affl  ict people in 
Mo’s country occur relatively frequently (nothing like one in a million), and this fact is 
generally known by the medical establishment and at least dimly appreciated by lay-
people such as Mo.) Finally, the belief is true. 
 Next, the doctor tells Mo that only one out of a million people have X. Let’s assume 
that the doctor has slipped up: in reality, about one out of a hundred people has the dis-
ease, the doctor knows this, but she misspoke. At this point Mo doesn’t change his belief: 
he still believes that if the test says you have X, then there’s an excellent chance you have 
X. He doesn’t realize that this new piece of information devastates his belief, as follows. 
 Suppose everything the doctor said  were true, including that only one out of a million 
people have the disease. Suppose further that ten million people take the test. Since about 
one in a million actually have the disease X, or so we’re supposing, about ten of the ten 
 million people will have the disease. When those ten people take the test, the odds are that the 
test will say “You have X” all ten times (as it is 99.9 per cent accurate in that sense). But now 
consider the remaining people, the 9,999,990 folks who don’t have X. When they take the 
test, 0.1 per cent of the time the test will mistakenly say “You have X.” Of 9,999,990 folks, 0.1 
per cent is about 10,000. So all told, the test will say “You have X” about 10,010 times: that’s 
the fi rst ten (who really do have X) plus the next 10,000 (who don’t have X). But only ten of 
those times is the test right. Thus, when the test says “You have X,” which is about 10,010 times, 
the test is wrong about 10,000 out of 10,010 times: it’s wrong about 99.9 per cent of the 
time! So if the doctor were right, then Mo’s belief that if the test says you have X then there’s 
an excellent chance you have X, would be about as false as it can get. 19 
 However, and this is a crucial bit of the story, we are assuming that Mo doesn’t cur-
rently have the background to grasp these mathematical matters, and as a consequence 
he does not see how the new (mis)information, about X’s extreme rarity (one in a mil-
lion), ruins the overall warrant he has for his belief. On the other hand, if Jo is a mathe-
matician who had heard precisely the same things as Mo and likewise came to have and 
then retain belief B, then given her mathematical competence she would be in a posi-
tion to see the relevance of the one-in-a-million claim. We would say of Jo, but not of 
Mo, that she “should know better” than to retain her belief B. Both Jo and Mo have 
made a  mistake in retaining B, both have an epistemic defect, but only Jo is blameworthy 
since only she has the cognitive tools and training to see the relevance of the one-in-a-
million claim. It would take hours to get Mo to see the relevance, as the above paragraph 
is too advanced for him; Jo should have seen it immediately. 
 Moreover, if knowledge is cheap and tenacious—in the sense of being little more 
than true belief, with a low threshold for warrant, and very hard to dislodge—then Mo’s 
 19 Given that one in a hundred people actually have disease X, Mo’s belief B is true, as a little calculation 
will show. The case described is a variant of ones used to illustrate the base-rate fallacy.  
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true belief might amount to knowledge even after hearing and accepting the doctor’s 
misinformation. Given that he knew the 99.9 per cent facts, the brute fact that the dis-
ease affl  icts about one out of a hundred people, and Mo is dimly aware that virtually all 
diseases have similar likelihood rates, Mo, like many informed people in his community, 
started out knowing that if the test says you have X then there’s an excellent chance you 
have X. When he hears his doctor’s one-in-million claim he cannot see how it goes 
against his belief. Since propositional knowledge is so cheap, he retains his knowledge. 
In addition, because justifi ed belief also has a low threshold, his belief remains justifi ed. 
 The Mo story can be used to motivate several interesting epistemological theses. For 
our purposes, it is best thought of as illustrating how the following might come about:
 • A person starts out with a belief B that is true, reasonable, justifi ed, and amounts 
to knowledge. 
 • Next, he acquires a belief C that in some sense “goes against” the fi rst belief B 
(this can happen in several ways, either targeting the truth of B, as in the Mo 
example, or perhaps targeting his justifi cation for B). 
 • Despite coming to believe C, the person retains the fi rst belief B. 
 • The retained belief B is still justifi ed and amounts to knowledge, as the “bars” for 
knowledge and justifi cation are very low. 
 • But his retaining B is still seriously epistemically defective. 
 I am  not saying that renegades with respect to error theories are in the same position as 
Mo. More specifi cally, renegades aren’t guilty of a cognitive defi ciency like Mo is. Even 
so, the illustration is useful because I think the renegade philosophers might be blame-
less just like Mo is. The renegade’s retained beliefs are  doxastically central (if one of them is 
blameworthy, then a fantastic amount of one’s beliefs will be blameworthy) and held 
with a  very high confi dence level . Given those two facts, it seems a bit extreme to have the 
threshold for blamelessness be so high that one is blameworthy in retaining beliefs that 
are both central and held with the highest levels of confi dence. Humans aren’t  that 
rational. The metaphilosophical skeptic should allow for the possibility that standards 
for epistemic blame are relative to the epistemic and doxastic capacities of the subject 
(or perhaps her community or species). 
 In order to bring out the relevant complexities concerning the  relative standards for 
epistemic blame, consider a non-epistemic example. A twelve-year-old girl plays third 
base for her Little League baseball team. The batter hits a sharp grounder to her right; 
she dives to get it but misses and falls down; the ball shoots off  down the left fi eld line for 
a double. No one is going to blame her for missing the ball: not her teammates, not her 
parents, not the manager, not even herself. However, if Brooks Robinson, who was one 
of the greatest fi elding third basemen in Major League history, had had the very same 
opportunity and did exactly what the child did, then he would have been blameworthy 
(for one thing, he would have been accorded an error by the game’s offi  cial scorer). 
Despite that diff erence, which depends on the individual circumstances—especially 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two players—both attempts to fi eld the ball 
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are “baseball defective.” It’s a good question as to why the child’s attempt is defective 
even though she was charged with no error and is blameless. The answer is probably 
something along the lines of “Being able to fi eld that ball is a goal associated with the 
role of a third baseman, and one that is typically attained by those who pursue the posi-
tion seriously.” I am saying that the metaphilosophical skeptic might want to allow that 
something similar is true of Mo and Jo: although only Mo is blameless, both belief reten-
tions are “epistemically defective.” Despite his present inability to see the error of his 
ways, Mo’s belief retention is epistemically defective because he is an epistemic agent 
and part of a community that is able to handle the mathematics needed to see the error. 
It would not exactly  kill him to see the relevance of the rarity of the disease. 
 To be sure, questions of blame are tricky—and in ways that may seem to matter to the 
skeptic’s position. Consider a diving leap by Brooks Robinson that fails to snag the ball. 
He really had almost no chance at getting it, so his attempt is hardly defective. Only 
Superman could have got the ball! But now imagine a race of superpeople who watch 
our baseball games. They say that Robinson’s dive is “baseball defective,” as  their best 
third basemen are usually able to snag the ball when faced with that play. But it seems 
incorrect  for  us to say that Robinson’s play is defective. Whether it’s defective depends on 
the relevant standards, and Robinson’s attempt does not fail to meet any of  our standards 
even if it does fail to meet the alien standards. Something similar may hold in epistemic 
cases. Perhaps there is a group of super-epistemic aliens for whom induction is just plain 
stupid. Only horribly weak creatures, they say, employ inductive reasoning. After all, it’s 
not even guaranteed to be truth preserving! They look upon us as primitive epistemic 
beings. Even if they are right about  all of that, it is hard to see how it would make it true 
 for us to say that all merely inductive reasoning is epistemically defective. 
 Thus, perhaps some renegades are not blameworthy. However, some  will be blame-
worthy: it depends on the tenacity of their belief in P. We can imagine two philosophical 
renegades, Barb and Ron. Both of them endorse W from the Overwhelming Warrant 
objection. We then confront them with “Yes, but suppose that 98 per cent of your 
10,000 epistemic superiors fi rmly believed P was false, and it had been this way for cen-
turies; what would you think then?” Barb responds in a level-headed way: “Well, I’d at 
least suspend judgment, if not accept their view.” Ron responds with bluster: “That 
would just mean those philosophers are nuts.” I think that in that scenario Ron comes 
out blameworthy, perhaps because his dispositions reveal an unreliable belief retention 
type. In any case, the charge of blame is so complicated that the skeptic is best advised to 
steer clear of it for the most part. 
 This shows how the skeptic should admit that for all she can be certain of, her thesis 
could be true even if (1), (2), and (5) are all true of S. The following story is intended to 
deal with (3) and (4). 20 
 20 I couldn’t think of the best case: one that handles all of (1)–(5) at once. But keep in mind that all I’m 
doing here is arguing that the skeptic should be willing to admit that for all she can be certain of (1)–(5) are 
true even though her thesis is true too. I’m not arguing that skepticism plus (1)–(5) really can all be true.  
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 Suppose Cho is an undergraduate physics major taking a standard course in classical 
mechanics. She does a problem from her textbook and gets the answer “4π.” But the 
answer key in the back of the book says “8π 2 .” And the better classmates in the class agree 
with the book’s answer. She rechecks her answer to make sure there is no calculation 
error. The teaching assistant for the class agrees with the book’s answer. As does the pro-
fessor. Cho consults a couple of other professors she likes and took courses from in the 
past: they also agree with the “8π 2 ” answer. Cho admits that these people are her epis-
temic superiors when it comes to classical mechanics, as the evidence for this judgment 
is obviously quite good and objective. At this point she has excellent evidence E 
1
 —the 
reports from recognized superiors—that there is excellent evidence E 
2
 against her 
answer. Despite all that, Cho sticks with her old answer, merely shrugging her shoulders 
and stubbornly fi guring that what the superiors say “doesn’t prove anything” as “no one 
is perfect.” I think it’s pretty clear that Cho is being irrational given that she meets Con-
dition 1 and Condition 2; in particular, by meeting the latter condition Cho doesn’t 
have anything up her sleeve, so to speak, that her professors and other superiors are miss-
ing. In at least one important epistemic sense she should give up her belief. The reason 
she should give up her belief is this: she has been given excellent  reason that it is false, the 
reason being E 
1
 . 
 That conclusion seems right. But the interesting point I want to make here is this: 
even though Cho has been given good  reason that “4π” is the wrong answer (and that 
“8π 2 ” is the right answer), this may not be the same thing as saying that she has been 
given good  evidence that “4π” is the wrong answer. What she actually has is testimonial E 
1
 . 
The evidence against her belief P (P is the claim that the answer is “4π”) is E 
2
 , which is 
some alternative calculation with which Cho is unfamiliar. Some philosophers would 
say that E 
1
 is evidence that her belief is false: at least in most cases if E is evidence that 
there is evidence against Q, then E itself is evidence against Q. I think there might be 
counterexamples to that bare principle, although if we throw in more conditions rele-
vant to the disagreement cases the counterexamples may vanish (for all I know). What I 
want to emphasize here is that even if having E 
1
 (and recognizing that it’s good evidence 
for the claim that there is good evidence against P) isn’t necessarily to have good  evidence 
for thinking P is false, it remains true that having E 
1
 gives one excellent  reason to think P 
is false. The issue isn’t whether E 
1
 is evidence. It’s defi nitely evidence of something. The 
issue here is whether E 
1
 —that body of knowledge which S possesses—is evidence 
 against P . Whether it is will depend on what the true story of evidence is, a position on 
which the metaphilosophical skeptic wants to avoid taking a position since she thinks 
her thesis is true independently of those details, as philosophically important as they are. 
 This separation of evidence from reason isn’t terribly counterintuitive, as the physics 
story shows. The Homer-Holmes case works as well. Homer knows that Sherlock Hol-
mes has a fantastic track record in murder investigations and has recently announced 
that he’s as confi dent as he’s ever been that he’s cracked the new case of the maid’s mur-
der: the butler did it. When Homer learns all this about Holmes he acquires excellent 
reason to think the butler did it. But does he acquire evidence that the butler did it? Well, 
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he certainly doesn’t have any of Holmes’ evidence. A philosopher could become 
 convinced that although Homer has excellent reason to think the butler’s guilty, he has 
no evidential reason. 
 Cho’s physics case is diff erent from Mo’s disease case. As we saw earlier, given Mo’s 
epistemic defi ciencies, the skeptic might allow that Mo has been given no reason to 
discard his belief. That’s not true of Cho; she has excellent reason to give up her 
belief. But Cho’s case illustrates how one’s retaining a belief can be epistemically 
defi cient even though its evidential status has not changed—given certain views 
about evidence. And if its evidential status hasn’t changed, then perhaps its warrant 
status hasn’t changed either. Naturally, it’s a signifi cant step from “Her evidential sta-
tus hasn’t changed” to “Her level of warrant hasn’t changed.” But as I’ve said a couple 
times already, the skeptic is trying to articulate her thesis in such a way that it’s not 
hostage to how various debates about evidence, warrant, knowledge, and justifi ca-
tion turn out (either next week or in the next century). Her central insight, if it 
deserves that status, is that if upon learning about her epistemic superiors the well-
informed mere mortal retains her belief, then that action of hers thereby suff ers a 
serious epistemic defect. 
 But what on earth could the defect in the  action be, now that we’ve allowed for the 
possibility that the retained renegade  belief is warranted, is justifi ed, is blameless, amounts 
to knowledge, and has no evidence against it? What epistemic defect could the action 
possibly have? It leads to a belief that is as good as it gets: it amounts to knowledge! 
 In order to answer the question I fi rst need to explain how the action might be epis-
temically defective even though the retained belief isn’t. Then I’ll say what I think the 
defect is. 
 Bub thinks claim C is true. But his belief is based on a poor reading of the evidence. 
Bub sticks with his belief in C despite the poor evidence just because he has a raging, 
irrational bias that rules his views on this topic. Suppose C is “Japan is a totalitarian state” 
and Bub has always been biased against the Japanese. 
 Then he meets George. After long discussion he learns that George is his peer when it 
comes to politics and Japan. He then learns that George thinks C is true. This is a case of 
peer  agreement , not disagreement. 
 I take it that when Bub learns all this about George, he has not acquired some new 
information that should make him think “Wait a minute; maybe I’m wrong about 
Japan.” He shouldn’t lose confi dence in his Japan belief C merely because he found 
someone who is a peer and who  agrees with him! 
 The initial lesson of this example:  Bub’s  action of not lowering his confi dence in his belief as 
a result of his encounter with George is reasonable even though his retained belief itself is unreason-
able . The right answer to “Should you lower your confi dence level in reaction to a rec-
ognized peer disagreement?” can be “no” even though the right answer to “If you don’t 
lower your confi dence level in that situation, is your belief reasonable?” is also “no.” 
Bub’s assessment of the original evidence concerning C was irrational, but his reaction 
to George was rational; his subsequent belief in C was (still) irrational. The simplistic 
162 bryan frances
question, “Is Bub being rational after his encounter with George?” is ambiguous and 
hence needs to be cut in two parts: “Is his retained belief in C rational after his  encounter 
with George?” vs. “Is his response to George rational?” The answer to the fi rst question 
is “No” while the answer to the second question is “Yes.” 
 This story is suffi  cient to show that one’s action of retaining one’s belief can be epis-
temically fi ne even though the retained belief is epistemically faulty. If we alter the story 
just a bit, we can see how the action can be faulty while the belief is fi ne. 
 Suppose that Bub started out with confi dence level 0.95 in C. And he found George 
to have the same confi dence level. And suppose that the original evidence Bub had only 
justifi es a confi dence level of 0.2. So like we said before Bub has grossly misjudged his 
evidence. If in reaction to his encounter with George Bub  did lower his confi dence in C 
to 0.2 or 0.4 or whatever—whatever level is merited by the correct principles of ration-
ality that make his belief in C rational 21 — he would be irrational . If you have a certain level 
of confi dence in some claim and fi ve minutes goes by in which you correctly and 
knowingly judge to have not been presented with any new evidence whatsoever that 
suggests that your confi dence level is mistaken, then you would be irrational to change 
your confi dence level—even if you happened to adjust so that your belief itself was 
rational. Now, if you took some time to reassess your original evidence, then of course 
you might learn something that would justify your changing your confi dence level. But 
if nothing like that has happened, as in Bub’s case, then you would be irrational to 
change your confi dence level. So if Bub did adjust his confi dence level to 0.2 or 0.4 or 
0.6 say, then although his subsequent confi dence level might accurately refl ect his total 
body of evidence—so his position on C would now be rational—his  process to that 
rational position would be irrational. 22 
 The renegade case is like this second story: the action is faulty while the retained 
belief might be fi ne. Now that I’ve explained the diff erence in the epistemic statuses of 
the retention action and retained belief, I can off er a conjecture as to what the serious 
epistemic defect might be in the case of the renegade who retains her belief in the face 
of her awareness of purely philosophical error theories. 
 In the imagined possibility that makes (1)–(5) true (for all we can be certain of  ), 
knowledge, warrant, and blamelessness are “lower” epistemic qualities. So, perhaps wis-
dom, deep understanding, cognitive penetration, and mastery (e.g. of a topic) are signifi -
cantly “higher” epistemic qualities. And being a renegade with respect to error theories 
inhibits the development of such qualities, at least with respect to the topics relevant to 
the error theories. If so, that would mean that the belief retention is still epistemically 
defective, and in a “serious” manner. 
 21 I’m assuming that there is a rational level of confi dence for his retained belief. I’m not sure how to 
argue for this claim.  
 22 This seems to show that Bub is epistemically at fault no matter what he does in response to his discov-
ery of George’s agreement with him. However, it doesn’t show that he is utterly epistemically doomed: he 
could go back and discover that his initial judgment was unjustifi ed. In that sense it’s not quite a case of 
“damned if you do and damned if you don’t.”  
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 So here is my theory regarding the epistemic defect in question, the one 
I  recommend for the metaphilosophical skeptic:
 • If the true story of epistemic relations is more or less what philosophers have 
thought, then renegades with respect to error theories lose the warranted and 
justifi ed statuses of their belief (and hence the knowledge status). 
 • On the other hand, if the threshold for justifi ed belief and knowledge is much 
lower than philosophers have thought, then the renegade’s retained belief might 
exceed those thresholds (contrary to the fi rst bullet point) even though its war-
rant has signifi cantly decreased. 
 • Finally, if the thresholds are low, if reason and evidence are separated (as in the Cho 
story), and if evidence and warrant are not separated (as in the Cho story), then 
although the warrant for the renegade’s retained belief might not change upon her 
learning of her superiors (contrary to the fi rst two bullet points), the belief retention 
process type is not conducive to epistemic qualities such as wisdom, deep understand-
ing, cognitive penetration, and mastery with respect to the topics the error theories 
are about (the topics: truth, material existence, meaning, morality, and so on). 
 I close this section with a few comments on what is meant by “the action of retaining 
the commonsensical belief P.” 
 One’s view of philosophical error theories is utterly divorced, psychologically, from 
real life. Even an advocate of an error theory will not have her view change her behav-
ior.  A color error theorist still says that she likes red cars and yellow bananas; a composi-
tional nihilist will insist to his insurance company that he really did have a television 
ruined by the fl ood in his basement. The same holds for philosophers like myself who 
have become agnostic on the truth-value of error theories. In fact, in many contexts the 
error theorists and agnostics will say things like “I know that her bag was red,” “I think 
there are four extra chairs in the next room,” which when interpreted straightforwardly 
strongly suggest that they are retaining the commonsensical beliefs. Given that we walk 
and talk exactly like someone who retains her commonsensical beliefs, if the common-
sensical philosopher’s belief retention is seriously epistemically defective, it’s not defective 
in virtue of  almost any of her real-life behavior, including much that is linguistic. Depend-
ing on what the notion of belief amounts to, it might be even true to say that in one sense 
of belief the error theorist and agnostic believe that some cars are red. Instead, the diff er-
ence between the commonsensical philosopher and the error theorist (or agnostic) 
comes to the fore in things like their dispositions and certain episodes of behavior, as 
when she says to herself things like “H can’t be right; P is right instead” while the error 
theorist and agnostic typically end up saying to themselves contrary things. 
 13 What if metaphilosophical skepticism is false? 
 I will now show that no matter what your take on the metaphilosophical skeptic’s argu-
ment, pro or con, you get a new and philosophically interesting conclusion. We all win 
in that respect. 
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 So let us now assume for the sake of argument that contrary to the Will of God and all 
forms of justice I have made a fatal error in the previous sections: metaphilosophical 
skepticism is completely false. So, the renegade’s belief in P and ~H amounts to know-
ledge, is fully justifi ed, and her belief retention suff ers no epistemic defect whatsoever. 
She is perfectly aware of the respected status of compositional nihilism, moral error 
theory, and color error theory; she knows that she is nothing remotely like an expert in 
those areas; she has no amazing piece of evidence or knowledge that the error theorists 
have missed; and yet there is nothing epistemically wrong in her just concluding that all 
those theorists are wrong and she’s right. 
 If that’s the way things are, then by my lights something is terribly amiss in a great 
portion of philosophy. However, what is amiss in the philosophical community is  not 
that the arguments for H must be pretty weak even though they are the well-respected 
products of our best and brightest working over many years. At least, we have no reason 
to leap to that conclusion even if we reject metaphilosophical skepticism. We already 
admitted in the discussion of the Overwhelming Warrant objection that the error the-
ory supporting arguments are at least on a par with many other philosophical arguments 
and are quite strong. The only problem with the former, it was alleged, was the rare 
strength of their opponent: virtually universal commonsense. 
 What must be true if metaphilosophical skepticism is false is that  purely philosophical 
theories against commonsense are virtually never worthy of belief .  And if that is true, then large 
parts of philosophy have to change, for the following reason. Virtually all wide-ranging 
metaphysical theories regarding composition, parthood, persistence over time, and so 
on, are radically anti-commonsensical at some point (it’s not hard to cleave to common-
sense if one isn’t comprehensive). The same holds for all theories of truth (that don’t 
ignore the semantic paradoxes) and all theories of vagueness and meaning. And yet, if 
skepticism is false, none of these theories is any good, as we philosophers  know full well 
that they are false even if we are aware of our status as amateurs and are perfectly aware of 
the impressive arguments for those theories. 
 Ontology, and metaphysics in general, is almost always said to be extremely hard; same 
for the philosophy of language, logic, and physics. But if the view being presently con-
sidered is true, then large parts of these areas are very easy.  After all, under the current 
assumption we already know that any theory that goes against virtually universal com-
mon sense is false—because the commonsense beliefs are known, we know which ones 
they are, and we’ve done the elementary deduction to see that they entail the falsehood 
of all the popular error theories. 
 As pointed out earlier, one can’t rely on distaste for metaphysics here. Error theories 
show up in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, the 
 philosophy of logic, the philosophy of mathematics, metaethics, and the philosophy of 
physics as well. Further, metaphysical thought is not always the source of those error 
theories. 
 To me, that sounds like a justifi cation for saying that many areas of philosophy 
are bunk. If I, as someone with a defi nitely amateur understanding of much of the 
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 philosophical areas just mentioned, can  know that all sorts of error theories are false even 
though I have absolutely nothing at all interesting to say against those theories—and if 
this knowledge of mine is not some anemic thing and there is nothing epistemically 
wrong with my retaining my commonsensical beliefs—then there is something deeply 
wrong with those areas of philosophy, since many of the most popular and expertly 
endorsed theories are error theories. Obviously, that last conclusion, “something is 
deeply wrong with those areas of philosophy,” has been endorsed for centuries with 
respect to some parts of metaphysics, but now we have a novel argument for the novel 
proposition that leads to it—as well as a  much more expansive conclusion, going well 
beyond metaphysics. Not only that: we conclude that those areas of philosophy are bunk 
despite their relying on arguments  as good as or even better than those found in other areas 
of philosophy. That is a paradoxical conjunction. 
 This gives us my essay’s disjunctive thesis that one of the following is true:
 •  Metaphilosophical skepticism is true. When it comes to ordinary philosophical 
disagreements, the renegade’s belief is unjustifi ed, unwarranted, and at least mildly 
blameworthy. When it comes to error theories, either we don’t know P or our 
retaining our belief in P is epistemically impoverished in the ways described at the 
end of section 12. 
 •  A good portion of the philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, phil-
osophy of logic, metaethics, philosophy of physics, and metaphysics is bunk and 
error theorists should give up most of their error theories despite the fact that 
their supporting arguments are generally as good as or even better than other 
philosophical arguments. 23 
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